II.

Rule of the Shah and Rise of Khomeini

In 1963 the shah began a series of social, economic, and political reforms known as the White Revolution. The revolution gave more freedom to women and increased secular education at the expense of religious education. These and other changes questioned the dominant role of Iran’s religious leaders, most of whom feared losing power and moral authority under the White Revolution. Throughout the 1970s the shah continued to anger traditional Shia Muslims, who formed a large proportion of the population. For example, the shah held festivals in 1971 to celebrate the 2500th anniversary of the pre-Islamic Persian Empire; this was perceived as a direct rebuke to the millions of Iranians who viewed the coming of Islam in the 7th century as the founding date of modern Iran.

Other sectors of the population were also becoming disenchanted with the shah. Students and intellectuals were frustrated by his autocratic rule and by the corruption of the royal family, who had become wealthy from their five decades in power. Many of these dissidents favored some form of democracy as well as a more equitable distribution of the country’s income. Members of the traditional middle class, or bazaaris, were angry as well, because they had received little benefit from either the White Revolution’s development schemes or from the country’s rapid, oil-fed growth in the 1970s. Most of the earnings had instead gone to larger companies, especially to ones with international ties or connections to the shah’s family. Both bazaaris and fundamentalist Muslims disapproved of Iran’s growing ties with the West.

All of these factors contributed to the rise of Ruhollah Khomeini, who in the early 1960s was a relatively unknown Islamic ayatollah, or holy man. Khomeini had several assets that other leaders lacked. First, he was seemingly fearless: In 1963 he was the only cleric to openly attack the shah’s White Revolution. Second, he spoke the language of the people, condemning the shah’s “injustices” in the name of the “downtrodden” masses. Third, and most importantly, Khomeini was able to transform Shia Islam into a mass ideology that appealed to many groups. In the past, Shia leaders had argued that although Shia Muslims were a righteous minority who suffered under cruel leaders, it was not their role to overthrow the ruling regime and create an Islamic state. Instead, Shia clerics should defend the religion and await the return of the 12th imam, the messianic figure of Shiism whose presence was needed for the establishment of an Islamic state. Khomeini, however, rejected this passive approach. He argued that by overthrowing the shah, Iranians would hasten the return of the 12th imam. Indeed, Khomeini did not discourage Iranians from thinking of him as the messianic imam. Khomeini spread his alluring mixture of revolutionary ideology and messianic revivalism by mobilizing a vast network of loyal disciples. He was also able to galvanize the support of the bazaari middle class, which had close links to the ulema, Iran’s religious leaders.

In 1964 the shah exiled Khomeini from Iran. Khomeini eventually settled in the Iraqi holy city of An Najaf, from which he broadcast his messages to his Iranian followers. In 1978 the Iraqi government, fearful that the ayatollah’s powerful message would create similar disturbances in Iraq, expelled Khomeini. He then went to France, from which he sent audio tapes of his revolutionary message to Iran.