IV.

Institutionalizing the Revolution

As the human and financial costs of the war mounted, pressure grew in Iran to break the enduring and paralyzing standoff between conservatives and reformers over domestic policy. Initially Khomeini tried to avoid intervening in the conflict—even when it prevented the passage of vital social legislation—but he eventually intervened on behalf of the reformers in the Majlis. He did so in part because he wanted to give the Majlis and other institutions more authority. He was also encouraged to intervene by the speaker of the Majlis, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who wanted to end the war with Iraq and begin economic reconstruction. Pressed by Rafsanjani and his allies, Khomeini created an extra-constitutional body called the Expediency Council, which was given the power to override vetoes by the Council of Guardians. Khomeini then supported the drafting of a new constitution, which was passed after his death in June 1989.

Many Iranians hoped the new constitution would give them greater social freedoms. Rafsanjani, who was elected president in 1989, encouraged these hopes. But while the constitution partly diminished the religious authority of the wali faqih and placed clerics on an equal footing with politicians, it reinforced the government’s powers to impose its decisions on society. Thus the revolution had become institutionalized, but at the cost of much of its popular support.