I.

Introduction

German Unification (1871), merging of the states in the North German Confederation and other German states to form the German Empire. Before unification, Germany had been divided into many small states, which were unified in a process that began in 1849 and ended in 1871. However, unification did not include millions of people who thought of themselves as German. For example, the Germans of Bohemia (modern Czech Republic) and Austria remained outside the German Empire.

German unification was a turning point in European history. The state that emerged in 1871 challenged Europe and the world in 1914 and again in 1939, and Germany's defeat on both occasions affected the course of international relations in the 20th century.

A number of forces favored unification. German identity was important to German intellectuals in particular, who argued that German history and myths made Germany distinctive. German businessmen saw the chance for larger markets in a united country. German Protestants dreamed of a state to balance the Catholic Habsburg regime that ruled Austria. German liberals wanted a modern, centralized political system, a representative government similar to that established in the United States in 1787.

German unification also faced powerful obstacles. A unified Germany had never before existed; states such as Hannover, Bavaria, and Prussia had developed their own identities. Proud of their independence, they were unwilling to abandon it. Moreover, the Habsburg Empire in Austria had a vested interest in a status quo that made it the primary power in central Europe. The idea of unification was not universally popular among the German people. Thousands of officials, merchants, and intellectuals had built lives as part of the existing order. Millions of ordinary men and women were indifferent to the question of who collected taxes and conscripted their sons for combat. Conservatives feared that destroying the traditional structure of small states would open the door to revolution and intervention by Europe's great powers.

II.

Otto von Bismarck

The principal architect of unification was Prince Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck, who was not a German nationalist, but a Prussian patriot. In 1851 Bismarck was appointed as Prussia's representative to the German Confederation, a loose organization of 39 German states. In 1859 he was transferred to Saint Petersburg as the ambassador to Russia because of his hostility to Austria and the small states composing the Confederation.

Bismarck returned to Prussia in 1862 to become prime minister. He was appointed to the post by Prussian King William I who hoped that Bismarck could handle a constitutional crisis. In 1849 Prussia had introduced a constitution creating a parliament that shared power with the crown in lawmaking. However, it did not specify how Parliament and the crown should resolve fundamental disagreements. Such a disagreement occurred in 1860 when the administration proposed a budget including significant increases in military spending. The lower house of Parliament was dominated by liberals who argued that this reform would further militarize Prussian society. The real issue, however, was Parliament's desire to control Prussia's purse and eventually Prussia's government as well. The budget was never approved. William, supported by the officer corps and the aristocracy, refused to compromise. Efforts to resolve the dispute proved futile, and by 1862 no senior official was willing to take on the task.

Prussian liberals accepted Bismarck's appointment as prime minister. His career had shown a tendency to inflammatory rhetoric and provocative behavior. Bismarck seemed just the man to drive the administration into a corner from which it could not escape. Bismarck's initial performance in office did not dispel that impression. He continued to collect taxes, justifying this behavior by arguing that a “gap” existed in the constitution and, pending its resolution, the machinery of government must be maintained. It was a clever idea, but no better than a temporary solution.

III.

Schleswig-Holstein Question

To break the deadlock, Bismarck sought to expand Prussia at the expense of its neighbors, believing that expansion would rally most Prussians to the king and isolate the liberals. He found an opportunity in the dispute over Schleswig-Holstein. Since the late 15th century, Schleswig-Holstein had been controlled by the king of Denmark. As recently as 1852, the great powers had agreed to continue this status, but in 1863 the Danish king, Christian IX, acting under pressure from Danish nationalists, annexed Schleswig-Holstein and integrated it more closely into Denmark.

This was a violation of international law, which provoked an outburst of nationalist rhetoric in the German states and serious diplomatic reactions in Prussia and Austria. Bismarck feared the Schleswig-Holstein question might become the focal point of a sustained German nationalist movement that would strengthen liberal and parliamentary forces in Prussia. At the same time, he saw the risk that Prussia and Austria, paralyzed by mutual suspicion, might allow the issue to become the subject of an international conference in which the fate of the German states would once again be determined by outsiders. Bismarck took the lead in denouncing Denmark's behavior. He also turned to Austria and stressed the merits of Austrian-Prussian cooperation both to preempt the German nationalists and to forestall possible action by Britain, France, and Russia.

The Austrian foreign office was sufficiently impressed by Bismarck's arguments to issue a joint demand with Prussia in January 1864 that Denmark restore the status quo. When Christian refused, a joint Austrian-Prussian expeditionary force occupied Holstein, then invaded Schleswig. The Danish army was overmatched by its much larger adversaries. Denmark's refusal to compromise, combined with the fact that its position was probably not legal, kept the rest of Europe from intervening. By midsummer 1864 the fighting was over.

The Prussian Parliament remained quiet during the entire affair, believing that Bismarck lacked the skill to succeed. Instead, the liberals expected him to create the kind of disaster that would force the government to turn to parliament out of sheer desperation. They were surprised and impressed by the fighting power of the newly reformed Prussian army. Despite Prussia's military success in Schleswig-Holstein, Bismarck was unable to resolve the impasse with parliament.

Austria did not have a direct interest in Schleswig-Holstein and was uncertain about what to do with the two duchies. A minor German prince, Frederick of Augustenburg, appeared to have a reasonable claim to be the ruler of the conquered territories, but Austria feared he would, by virtue of geography, fall under the influence of Prussia. Accordingly, Austria was prepared to consider Bismarck's proposal to administer the duchies directly, with Schleswig going to Prussia and Holstein to Austria. This proposal became the Gastein Convention, signed in August 1865. Austria expected Schleswig, with its large Danish population, to create serious domestic problems for Prussia, problems that might tie Bismarck's hands in foreign affairs.

IV.

The Seven Weeks’ War

This was not the case, however; Bismarck proceeded to focus on a wider goal: forcing Austria to relinquish its traditional influence in northern Germany. To this end, Bismarck courted Napoleon III, the ruler of the Second French Empire. Napoleon wanted to establish France as the primary power in Europe, but he was indecisive and lacked a clear vision of how to realize his goals for France. Throughout 1865, Bismarck encouraged Napoleon to accept Prussian dominance in northern Germany. In return, Bismarck hinted that Prussia would support French ambitions in Belgium, Luxembourg, and perhaps even the Rhineland. Without French cooperation, Bismarck suggested that Prussia would have to turn to Austria, France's traditional enemy, and Russia, long France's rival for the position of power broker among the European great powers.

Napoleon saw Bismarck's friendship as a means of enhancing French influence at no risk. Prussia and Austria appeared to be on a collision course. The adversaries seemed to be matched evenly enough to produce a diplomatic and military stalemate. Napoleon saw himself as a possible mediator between the two powers. In October 1865 he met with Bismarck at Biarritz in southwestern France. When Bismarck returned to Berlin, he was convinced that France probably would not oppose Prussian initiatives in the near future.

Bismarck's friendship with Napoleon was not lost on the Austrians. In January 1866 Austria responded by permitting public demonstrations in Holstein supporting the Prince of Augustenburg as ruler of the duchies. Bismarck promptly raised the stakes, calling in April 1866 for the creation of a parliament of the German Confederation elected by universal male suffrage. This proposal appeared to align conservative Prussia not only with the burgeoning German nationalist movement in the duchies, but with liberal, democratic sentiments held in check since the late 1840s.

Austria then moved forward with a series of military and diplomatic initiatives. Austria lined up support in the Confederation. Baden-Württemberg, Hannover, Hessen-Kassel and Bavaria, even Saxony (Sachsen), decided with varying degrees of enthusiasm that supporting the Habsburgs was the best way to preserve a system that Bismarck appeared willing to destroy. Austria began moving troops towards the Prussian frontier.

The Prussian chief of the general staff, Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, insisted that Prussia must respond or risk being overrun. William, reluctant to risk what he called a “brother's war,” temporized until May 3, when he ordered partial mobilization as well.

The mutual movement of troops created its own dynamic. The Austrian government saw the military option as its best remaining chance for success. It was clear to the Austrians that Bismarck wanted a resolution on his terms. In April Bismarck had concluded an anti-Austrian alliance with Italy, an agreement that was good for only 90 days, largely because the Italians did not trust Bismarck. Bismarck was willing to let Austria provoke the hostilities. On June 1, 1866, the Habsburgs obliged by turning over the Schleswig-Holstein issue to the German Confederation. This was a technical, but clear, violation of the Gastein Convention's terms. Prussia declared war.

The resulting conflict, known as the Seven Weeks' War, was resolved quickly. Prussia's army defeated its foes in a series of battles culminating on July 3 with a decisive triumph over the main Austro-Saxon force at Königgrätz. By mid-July Prussian troops had reached Vienna.

William and his generals wanted a triumphal march into Austria's capital, but Bismarck insisted on generous terms of peace. He had achieved Prussian dominance of northern Germany. To humiliate Austria further meant creating a permanent, implacable rival. It also meant alarming the rest of a Europe uncertain about what Prussia would do with its newly acquired power. Finally, humiliating Austria would alienate elements in Germany that Bismarck wanted to conciliate.

V.

The North German Confederation

Bismarck now finally had the opportunity to resolve the domestic political impasse he inherited in 1862. In the aftermath of Königgrätz, he offered Prussia's liberals a compromise. As he went about setting up the new North German Confederation, Bismarck proposed to admit he had governed illegally, provided parliament would agree to forgive him. Pleased with the victory over Austria, the liberals in parliament believed their political and economic goals could best be achieved in the context of a national state. Thus, Bismarck received from the parliament indemnity for the years in which he governed without authority. Parliament's liberals also feared being outflanked by Bismarck's surprising proposal for universal male suffrage in the North German Confederation. Many liberals believed that ultimately Bismarck would be unable to control the confederation by himself. Sooner or later, they reasoned, he would need help. Then they would be able to move the new North German Confederation in liberal directions.

The North German Confederation included a Prussia enlarged by territorial annexations, Hannover, and Saxony, plus a few nominally independent states. It was a constitutional system. The conservative upper house, representing the states, had extensive control over foreign policy and economic affairs. The lower house was elected through free and universal male suffrage by secret ballot—the most liberal franchise in Europe. The lower house also controlled the confederation's budget, a provision liberals had long sought.

The new confederation pursued a policy of economic freedom, congenial to the business community. A unified criminal law code, religious freedom, federal post and telegraph services—these and other long-standing liberal aims were put in place in a matter of months. It seemed the confederation was well on its way to becoming a centralized nation-state on the liberal model.

Bismarck did not attempt to annex or coerce the south German states of Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg to join the confederation in 1866. Instead, he chose to make his new confederation so attractive that the southern states would seek to join voluntarily. However, they kept their distance from a system that seemed too liberal, too Protestant, and above all too Prussian.

VI.

Franco-Prussian War

Prussia's international position was not yet secure. Austria made no secret of its desire to revise the results of 1866, but the principal challenge came from France. Confronted with domestic unrest and burdened by foreign-policy failures such as the French intervention in Mexico from 1864 to 1867, Napoleon's government sought new territory on the Rhine and in Belgium. Bismarck's refusal to cooperate contributed to France's sense of decline. Some of Napoleon's advisers began to see war as a way to improve France's stature.

Four years of tension between France and Prussia peaked in 1870, when the Spanish Parliament offered its throne, vacant since 1868, to a member of the Catholic branch of the House of Hohenzollern, whose Protestant head was the king of Prussia. The candidate, Prince Leopold, had only nominal connections with Prussia. Nevertheless, Napoleon's government saw the Hohenzollern candidacy as a threat, sandwiching France between a potentially hostile coalition that would challenge France's position in Europe. William, who opposed the candidacy from the beginning, responded to French initiatives by persuading his relative to withdraw.

France then overplayed its hand by asking William to forbid any future revival of the project—if he did not, France would go to war against Prussia. Buttonholed by the French ambassador while taking a vacation at the German resort of Bad Ems, William politely declined to make such a commitment and sent a message to Bismarck, informing him of the exchange.

Bismarck for his part saw conflict with France as a means of rallying nationalists in Germany under Prussian leadership and establishing Prussia as the primary power in a new European order. He attempted a diplomatic solution, but when France refused to concede the point, Bismarck decided that the Hohenzollern candidacy was grounds for war. He edited Williams's message to remove all conciliatory phrasing, then released it to the press. Liberals and nationalists in the North German Confederation, as well as in the south, insisted France be taught a lesson.

The Germans enthusiastically supported the war effort. The Prussian army destroyed its French opponents and captured the emperor himself at Sedan on September 2, 1870. Bismarck had defeated his enemy so completely that he had no one with whom to negotiate. A Government of National Defense was formed in Paris to carry on the war until mid-January of 1871, when Paris fell to the Prussians, and the war ended.

Fearing great-power intervention if the war dragged on, Bismarck moved quickly to end the conflict on terms most suitable to Prussia. Believing France would remain irreconcilably hostile, he insisted on annexation of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, a 5-billion-franc indemnity, and a victory march through Paris.

VII.

The German Empire

As the war ended, Bismarck took advantage of the military situation to transform the North German Confederation into the German Empire. Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria saw no alternative to accepting William as German emperor—particularly since treaties guaranteed them a significant degree of autonomy. For Bismarck, the empire was a compromise with what he regarded as the irresistible forces of liberalism and nationalism. The German Empire had one of the most liberal constitutions in Europe. The government's parliament, elected by universal suffrage, was paired with a conservative emperor, William I, and Chancellor Bismarck, who ruled with an iron hand and was responsible only to the emperor. If Prussia could not dominate the new German order, it could exercise supervision and control, at least as long as Otto von Bismarck was in power. On January 18, 1871, the German Empire was formally proclaimed and William was crowned emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, France.