V.

The Pacific Theater

Two months before the U.S. victory in the Caribbean, U.S. ships had already destroyed Spain’s naval forces in the Philippines. An often debated question is why, in a war undertaken to end Spanish rule in Cuba, a U.S. naval squadron should have been ordered to destroy a Spanish naval squadron based in Manila, over 9000 miles away. A fairly prevalent theory ascribes it to the so-called imperialism of Theodore Roosevelt.

Roosevelt had become assistant secretary of the navy in 1897. His energy and enthusiasm had contributed notably to the readiness of the U.S. Navy in the Spanish-American War. Late in 1897, before he resigned to organize the Rough Riders, he had insisted on the appointment of Commodore George Dewey to command the Asiatic Squadron. Dewey was an energetic and determined officer, capable of swift and forceful action. On February 25, 1898, Roosevelt sent Dewey a cable warning him of the need for vigorous action against the Spanish squadron at Manila in case of war with Spain. However, it is probable that Roosevelt was thinking simply of wiping out Spanish sea power wherever it existed, rather than of American empire building. He was an ardent disciple of Captain Alfred T. Mahan, whose views on the importance of control of the seas were consistent with the actions Roosevelt took. However, Roosevelt’s famous dispatch to the Asiatic Squadron had little bearing on Dewey’s actions. The commodore had orders to attack the Spanish force in Manila when he left the United States in December 1897, and he got specific orders to do this after war broke out.

A.

Battle of Manila Bay

Dewey had his squadron concentrated in the British harbor of Hong Kong when the war message arrived on April 24, 1898. He had four steel cruisers—Olympia, Baltimore, Boston, and Raleigh—and two seagoing gunboats—Concord and Petrel. The Spanish commander at Manila, Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasaron, was as unprepared as the unfortunate Cervera in Cuba. He had a total of seven ships. His flagship Reina Cristina could be described as a cruiser. The other ships, except for a small, wooden corvette, were steel or iron gunboats, mostly in poor repair.

Dewey left Hong Kong on April 25. When he arrived at Manila Bay he faced several difficulties. He knew that the narrow entrance to the bay was defended by heavy guns mounted on the islands of Corregidor and El Fraile. He also had reason to believe that the channel was mined. Furthermore, if any of his ships were to be severely damaged, he would have no means of making repairs—he was 7000 miles from the nearest home port, and Hong Kong and other neutral ports were now being closed to him.

None of these difficulties deterred Dewey, however, and he led his darkened squadron into the harbor entrance. No mines exploded and there was only scattered gunfire. As day broke on May 1, Dewey’s squadron was well within Manila Bay. The city of Manila lay dead ahead, defended by batteries that began long-range and ineffective firing at the U.S ships. Montojo’s squadron, not Manila, was Dewey’s immediate objective. He bore away southward toward the Spanish naval station at Cavite. Increasing daylight revealed the Spanish warships at anchor there.

At 5:40 am, Dewey gave the order to fire. As in the Caribbean, the battle was over in just a few hours, resulting in the destruction of the Spanish squadron. Spanish casualties included at least 160 dead and 210 wounded. The U.S. forces had no fatal casualties. Only two officers and six men were wounded, none seriously. None of the U.S. ships were badly damaged.

B.

Occupation of Manila

In spite of the victory, Dewey’s problems were just beginning. He was holding Cavite with a few dozen Marines. In the city of Manila, 12 miles away, there were 13,000 Spanish troops. A Filipino insurrection was in progress against the Spanish, but the U.S. government could not make up its mind whether to help the rebels or not. A further problem soon presented itself. Britain, France, and Germany all sent warships to protect the interests of their nationals in the Philippines. Behind these naval maneuvers was an implied threat to move in if the United States itself did not take possession of the Philippines.

Dewey threatened to bombard Manila if Spanish shore batteries fired on his ships. When U.S. troops began to arrive on July 17, the pressure eased rapidly. U.S. troop strength reached 8500 by the end of July, and Dewey and the Army demanded the surrender of Manila on August 7. They then arranged with the Spanish captain general to occupy key positions before the Filipino insurgents did. The U.S. flag was hoisted over Manila on August 13.