VI.

Conclusions

The Allies eventually won in North Africa but only after a campaign lasting nearly two and a half years. The balance of advantage had swung to and fro in the Libyan desert and had only finally swung in favor of the Allies with the twin events of the Battle of El ‘Alamein and the Operation Torch landings. British tactical shortcomings had loomed large throughout the campaign, particularly in their handling of tank and infantry formations, which were only really corrected in the autumn of 1942. In contrast, the Afrika Korps had gained an enviable reputation for tactical prowess and formidable skill on the battlefield.

Ultimately, the relative importance of the theater to the two sides determined the outcome of the campaign. Hitler considered the North African campaign a sideshow and distraction from his much larger campaign against the Soviet Union (see Operation Barbarossa). This meant that Rommel’s army rarely had the resources necessary to develop its victories into more permanent strategic success. By contrast, Churchill and the British War Cabinet gave the North African campaign the highest strategic priority and thus were willing to use whatever resources were necessary to achieve success.

The German failure to recognize the full risks and opportunities of the North African campaign eventually cost them dearly. Within six months, the Allies were able to use North Africa as the launch pad for their continuing operations against Sicily and Italy, which soon drove Italy out of the Axis war effort. Perhaps most importantly, the North African campaign provided, in Churchill’s words, “the hinge of fate” or turning point that gave the Allied powers evidence that the seemingly invincible fascist powers could actually be defeated.

From a longer perspective, the North African campaign can be seen as one of the last European imperial conflicts. The campaign was largely fought over the heads of the native inhabitants of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. The Allied victory seemed to confirm British dominance in the Mediterranean but this was to prove short-lived. Within 14 years of their victory in North Africa, the Suez Crisis brought home forcibly to the previous colonial powers of France and Britain that they no longer controlled the destinies of the region.