II.

Background to the War

The seeds for the U.S.-Iraq War were sown by the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which took place during the administration of U.S. president George Herbert Walker Bush, George W. Bush’s father. During the Persian Gulf War, allied forces evicted Iraqi troops from Kuwait, which Iraq invaded in 1990. After allied forces defeated the Iraqi army, armed rebellion against Hussein’s rule broke out among the Shia Muslims of the south, who had suffered years of oppression under Hussein’s Sunni Muslim regime (see Shia Islam; Sunni Islam). The Bush administration had encouraged Iraqis to rebel in the hope that Hussein would be overthrown, but removing him from power was not an explicit objective of the allies. The administration was wary of involving itself in the fighting inside Iraq and was apprehensive about the consequences of a Shia victory. It decided not to intervene. Lacking international aid, the rebellion was crushed by Hussein's remaining forces. Many Iraqi Shia never forgave the United States for what they saw as a betrayal.

A.

UN Weapons Inspections

As part of the cease-fire arrangements after the Persian Gulf War, the United Nations (UN) Security Council ordered Iraq to eliminate its programs to develop biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. A system of UN inspections was established to oversee this process. Over the next decade UN inspectors made important strides in disarming Iraq, but faced resistance from Iraqi authorities to their requests that all information about the destruction of stockpiles be made available. Iraq denied inspectors access to some sites within the country, and much of the information Iraq provided about its weapons programs was viewed as incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading. Some inspectors believed that Iraq had destroyed 85 percent of its stockpiles, and in retrospect they were more nearly correct, but others remained suspicious that Iraq was hoarding biological and chemical weapons or capabilities. See also Chemical and Biological Warfare.

Frustrated by Iraq’s apparent refusal to cooperate, U.S. president Bill Clinton ordered a series of air strikes in 1998 aimed at destroying Iraq’s weapons-making capability. UN weapons inspectors were withdrawn shortly before the United States and Britain carried out three days of air attacks. Following the air strikes, Iraq resisted the resumption of UN inspections. No inspections were conducted for four years, a development that led to considerable uncertainty in Washington about the status of Iraq’s weapons programs.

B.

Making the Case for War

B.1.

“Neoconservatives” and the Bush Doctrine

Long before President George W. Bush took office in 2001, elements in or close to the Republican Party had called repeatedly for firmer U.S. steps against Iraq, including a war if necessary to force a regime change. One such group authored a white paper in 1996 called A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, which was later sent to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of Israel’s Likud Party. It advocated a war against Iraq as a way of undermining Syria and of moderating the Shia Hezbollah of southern Lebanon, arguing that these actions would pave the way for peace and stability in a notoriously unstable part of the world. The paper came out of discussions among foreign policy experts, including Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, Robert Loewenberg, David Wurmser, and Meyrav Wurmser, many of whom later occupied important positions in the Bush administration.

In 1997 some of the same individuals joined the newly formed Project for a New American Century (PNAC), a Washington think tank that argued openly for the United States to play a dominant role, militarily and diplomatically, in the world. The PNAC wrote a letter to President Clinton in January 1998 calling for “the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime” from power and urging Clinton to use “a full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts” to accomplish this. The letter warned that if Hussein acquired weapons of mass destruction, “the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard.” Iraq’s oil reserves are estimated to be the second largest in the world, after Saudi Arabia. Signatories to the letter included Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, William Kristol, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Donald Rumsfeld.

A month later the same signatories joined a broader group of foreign policy and defense experts known as the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf in another open letter to President Clinton. This letter was more explicit in calling for the use of military force, including a call for a “systematic air campaign” to destroy Iraq’s Republican Guard divisions. These efforts helped lead to the Iraq Liberation Act, passed by Congress and signed by Clinton in 1998, which made regime change in Iraq official U.S. policy. In the Bush administration of three years later, Wolfowitz would become deputy secretary of defense, with Rumsfeld as his boss. Abrams would become a National Security Council adviser on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Bolton would be an undersecretary of state and then ambassador to the United Nations. Khalilzad served as ambassador to post-Taliban Afghanistan and then to post-Saddam Iraq.

Perle, Wolfowitz, Feith, Abrams, and others in their circle maintained that by democratizing Middle East countries with authoritarian regimes, the chances were greater of promoting peace in that region. In addition, many of these advisers were politically sympathetic both to the right wing of the Republican Party and to the Likud Party in Israel. Many had been, or their parents had been, on the political left, but they had typically become Republicans in the late 1970s or in the 1980s, driven by a belief that the Democratic Party was soft on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and that the American left was increasingly sympathetic to the Palestinians at the expense of Israel. Because of their turn to the right, they were known as neoconservatives. Many of the so-called neoconservatives, however, reject this label.

Because of their key positions in the Department of Defense, including in Vice President Dick Cheney’s own national security council, and in the Near East and South Asia division’s Office of Special Plans under Feith, the neoconservatives were in a position to influence Bush administration policy on Iraq. Some critics accused them of being overly eager to believe shaky intelligence on alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs provided by expatriate politician Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress, much of which was later found to be false.

This circle was not the only one interested in an Iraq war. George W. Bush repeatedly said in the late 1990s and in 2000 that among his aspirations in life was to “take out” Saddam Hussein, who he believed was behind an assassination attempt on his father. Cheney had signed the 1998 PNAC letter calling for regime change, even though as secretary of defense in the early 1990s he had opposed ousting Hussein by sending U.S. forces on to Baghdād from Kuwait, saying that it would be a mistake to be “bogged down” in a quagmire. Rumsfeld reportedly saw ousting Hussein and establishing an Iraqi government aligned with U.S. interests as the key to changing the entire Middle East region. Moreover, by September 2002, the Bush administration had outlined a new foreign policy strategy, known as the Bush Doctrine, which called for preemptive war to prevent terrorists or state sponsors of terrorism from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. The Bush Doctrine also held that the United States would act unilaterally if necessary to guarantee that the United Sates remained the sole superpower in the world.

In contrast, three major wings of the Republican Party warned against an Iraq war. The so-called realists who had dominated the foreign policy establishment of President George H. W. Bush in the early 1990s, such as former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and former secretary of state James Baker, publicly argued against an invasion of Iraq. Likewise, isolationists such as Patrick Buchanan opposed such a war, as did the libertarian wing of the party, which fears big government.

B.2.

Contingency Plans for War

Ever since the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military had contingency plans to invade Iraq. Military planning began in earnest, however, in the months after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon, near Washington, D.C. (see September 11 Attacks). The U.S. intelligence community quickly concluded that the attacks were the work of al-Qaeda, an international terrorist organization led by Saudi Arabian millionaire Osama bin Laden and based in Afghanistan. In October, a U.S.-led international coalition invaded Afghanistan and within weeks overthrew the ruling Taliban regime, which had supported al-Qaeda. Emboldened by the success, the Bush administration turned its attention to Iraq.

President Bush began to make the case publicly for military action against Iraq in his January 2002 State of the Union speech in which he identified Iraq as a member of an “axis of evil,” along with neighboring Iran and North Korea. All three nations, Bush said, were threatening global security. The Bush administration viewed Iraq as a rogue state and Hussein as a regional troublemaker in the volatile Middle East. Iraq, like many Arab states, opposed Israel, a U.S. ally, and supported the Palestinian cause (see Arab-Israeli Conflict).

However, various insider accounts later disclosed that the Bush administration’s plans for war with Iraq began in early 2001. According to Paul O’Neill, the administration’s former treasury secretary, planning for war with Iraq began almost as soon as Bush took office. Bush’s former head of counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, later wrote that immediately after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Bush approached him with a demand to learn if Iraq could be linked to the attacks. And the day of the attacks Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz all raised the question of whether to attack Iraq, not just Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, with Rumsfeld calling it “an opportunity,” according to an account by Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward.

By July 2002 the Bush administration had decided that military action against Iraq was inevitable, according to a British government memo, known as the Downing Street Memo after it was leaked to a British newspaper. Although the Bush administration was publicly proclaiming at the time that war was “a last resort,” the memo revealed that the Bush administration had “no patience” for going through the United Nations and that detailed military planning was taking place between the U.S. and British military commanders. The Downing Street Memo stated: “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”

B.3.

Prewar Intelligence Claims

The stated concern of the administration was over Iraq’s alleged program to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Bush administration asserted that Iraq possessed large stockpiles of lethal chemical weapons, had accelerated its program to make biological weapons, and was actively seeking materials to make nuclear weapons. Key figures such as Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice refrained from qualifying these claims. In August 2002 Cheney told a meeting of the Veterans of Foreign Wars that “there is no doubt” that Iraq under Hussein was amassing weapons of mass of destruction to use against the United States and its allies. And in September he told a Republican fundraising meeting in Casper, Wyoming, that “we now have irrefutable evidence” that Hussein had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program. The administration claimed that with such an arsenal, Hussein could provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for use against the United States, while also implying that Hussein was linked with al-Qaeda. In all, Bush administration officials made about 935 claims relating to Iraq’s possession of WMD and ties to al-Qaeda, according to a database compiled by the Center for Public Integrity.

In speeches and reports Bush and his administration made the case for preemptive military action to avoid such a potential threat. “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long,” Bush said in June 2002. In his January 2003 State of the Union address, Bush cited reports that Hussein had attempted to buy “significant quantities of uranium from Africa” as well as special aluminum tubes in order to produce nuclear weapons. The charge that Iraq sought uranium from Africa was later to reverberate in the Valerie Plame Wilson affair. In the aftermath, it became clear that both allegations were incorrect. The allegation that Iraq sought uranium from Africa was based on forged documents. The charge that it had bought aluminum tubes for use in a nuclear weapons program was disputed at the time by experts in the administration’s Department of Energy and was later found to be baseless by weapons inspectors following the U.S. invasion. Another claim that Iraq was developing mobile biological weapons laboratories was based on the claims of an Iraqi defector known as Curve Ball, but his alleged eyewitness description of a biological weapons site was later discredited by satellite photographs of the site.

Opponents of military action against Iraq challenged the Bush administration’s case. They argued that an invasion to overthrow Hussein would pull resources away from the U.S. campaign against terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the war in Afghanistan. Critics pointed to an October 2002 assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which concluded that Hussein was unlikely to cooperate with terrorist groups unless he felt that his regime was in peril. Critics also said that information about Iraq’s weapons programs was uncertain, that Iraq could be pressured to readmit UN weapons inspectors, and that the Hussein regime did not present an imminent threat. War opponents also argued that the Bush administration had not developed an effective exit strategy under which U.S. troops could be withdrawn from Iraq after the war.

Critics of the contention that the Hussein regime maintained ties with al-Qaeda, and in particular with one of its leading members, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, appeared to have been vindicated in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion. In September 2006 the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, led by Republican senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, concluded that there was no evidence linking the Iraqi government to al-Qaeda, the September 11 attacks, or Zarqawi. It was also shown that information provided by a suspected al-Qaeda detainee alleging a connection between Hussein and al-Qaeda was obtained under torture in an Egyptian prison. The detainee later recanted his statements. In March 2008 the Department of Defense released a study that concluded there was no direct connection between the Saddam Hussein regime and al-Qaeda. The study was based on an analysis of 600,000 Iraqi government documents seized by U.S. forces after the invasion and the interrogations of former top officials in Hussein’s government.

Opposition to a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was widespread among European political leaders, but with the United States still shaken by the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration won the domestic debate. In October 2002 the U.S. Congress voted to authorize the use of military force to defend the United States against “the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” The Bush administration had pushed for the vote to be held prior to congressional elections in November, which placed increased political pressure on the lawmakers to support military action against Iraq. In the Senate the resolution passed by a 77-23 margin. The Republican majority in the Senate overwhelmingly approved the measure, with only 1 Republican and 1 independent joining 21 Democrats in opposition. In the House the vote also largely followed party lines with 6 Republicans joining 127 Democrats in opposing the authorization.

C.

International Debate

After receiving congressional support for military action against Iraq, the Bush administration turned to the UN. British prime minister Tony Blair, the White House’s staunchest foreign ally in its campaign against Hussein, had urged Bush to seek UN approval. Blair believed that he needed UN backing in order to build support in Britain for the operation.

Most UN member states, however, hoped to avoid a conflict by pressuring Iraq to let UN inspectors return. On October 8 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441, stating that Iraq was in “material breach of its obligations” for failing to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors. The Security Council measure demanded that Iraq provide a complete accounting of its weapons programs and unrestricted access to all buildings, equipment, and records. The resolution also called for Iraq to allow UN inspectors to transport Iraqi scientists and their families outside of Iraq. That way the scientists would not be subject to intimidation by the Iraqi government when they were interviewed. In November, Iraq agreed to allow inspectors to reenter the country and resume their work.

The renewed weapons inspections were in some ways quite successful. Iraq granted access to former and suspected weapons sites that had previously been concealed. The Iraqi government also agreed to destroy certain missiles that were capable of hitting targets more than 150 km (90 mi) away (a range prohibited by previous disarmament agreements). On the other hand, Iraq did not facilitate private interviews with Iraqi scientists and weapons makers, and the government was not forthcoming about the details of its earlier weapons programs.

Although inspectors visited 100 of 600 sites designated as suspicious by Western powers, they found nothing of interest. On March 7, Mohammad ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told the UN Security Council: “After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq.” An earlier March 6 working paper by the UN weapons inspectors concluded with regard to chemical and biological weapons, “No proscribed activities, or the result of such activities from the period of 1998-2002 have, so far, been detected through inspections.”

The UN Security Council was sharply divided about what action to take next and faced an impasse. In order for a Security Council resolution to pass, 9 out of 15 members must vote for it. However, any of the 5 permanent members may veto it. The United States and Britain (permanent members of the Security Council) and Spain (a nonpermanent member) favored a second resolution that would have set a March 17, 2003, deadline for Iraq to disarm or face the consequences. But France, Russia, and China (permanent members) and Germany (nonpermanent member) were opposed, arguing that it was too soon to give up on the inspections. Most of the other nonpermanent members also opposed military action. The opposition of France and Germany, longtime U.S. allies, particularly troubled the Bush administration.

This was not the only foreign policy complication that the United States faced. The United States had hoped to open a northern front against Iraq from neighboring Turkey. The plan was to use Turkish soil as a staging area for a drive south by the U.S. Army’s 4th Infantry Division, which would complement a larger ground attack mounted from Kuwait, in the southeast. However, the newly elected Turkish government was reluctant to agree to this due to overwhelming opposition from the Turkish public. The United States offered $6 billion in grants and additional billions in credits if Turkey agreed to its plan, but Turkey’s parliament rejected the plan. Turkey’s decision represented a major setback for the Bush administration, not only because it interfered with U.S. military strategy. It also deprived the United States of the support of a largely Muslim nation, which would have helped lend additional credibility to an invasion of Iraq in the Islamic world.

D.

Last Moves

Faced with opposition in the Security Council and reluctance on the part of Turkey, the United States and Britain remained determined to take military action and assembled a coalition force in Kuwait. The coalition force consisted of a U.S. force that initially numbered about 200,000 personnel (eventually expanding to 290,000), of which 100,000 formed the invasion force. In addition, there were about 50,000 British personnel, about 2,000 Australian troops, and about 200 Polish soldiers. Coalition planners felt that if there was to be a war, it was better to have it sooner than later. A major factor was the weather: In the summer, the temperature in Iraq can soar to more than 50°C (120°F), which would hamper military operations.

In the week leading up to the war the Bush administration continued to press its claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that it was allied with al-Qaeda. In an appearance on the Meet the Press television show, Vice President Cheney claimed that Hussein had “a long-standing relationship” with al-Qaeda and had “in fact” reconstituted a nuclear weapons program. Cheney also predicted that U.S. forces would “be greeted as liberators.”

On March 17 in a nationally televised speech, Bush said, “Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq government continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.” Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his immediate family 48 hours to leave the country or face a military attack. It was later disclosed that Hussein had offered to leave Iraq and go into exile but under conditions that were not acceptable to the Bush administration. As UN weapons inspectors evacuated Iraq on March 18, Hans Blix, head of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), indicated that he believed the inspectors should have been given more time to investigate Iraq’s weapons programs.

On March 19 the United States conducted an air strike in an attempt to kill Hussein. It involved an attack on the Dora Farms area of Baghdād where Hussein was believed to be holding a meeting in a bunker. After the war, the U.S. military determined that there was no bunker at this location. A number of civilian casualties resulted from this attack.

The war began on March 20. The invasion of Iraq, dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom by the White House, was led by General Tommy Franks, then head of the U.S. Central Command.