III.

Al-Qaeda’s Organization

Western intelligence agencies have learned much about al-Qaeda’s internal organization from defectors and informants, especially from the testimony of four men convicted in a federal district court in New York City for their role in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. According to this information, al-Qaeda’s organizational structure incorporates both top-down and bottom-up approaches.

As part of the top-down approach, bin Laden is regarded as al-Qaeda’s emir-general. The emir-general provides spiritual guidance as well as strategic and operational oversight and is the preeminent leader of the movement, the most highly respected figure in al-Qaeda. As emir-general, bin Laden outlines al-Qaeda’s objectives and issues orders to ensure their implementation. A majlis al-shura (consultative council) addresses important policy and strategy issues, approving fatwas and authorizing major terrorist operations. Four operational committees, which are responsible for military activities, finance and business, fatwas and other religious matters, and publicity and media, report to the majlis al-shura.

At the same time, bin Laden also seeks ideas for attacks from below, encouraging creative approaches and “out of the box” thinking from al-Qaeda operatives and sympathizers. He then provides funding to those proposals he finds most promising. In this respect, al-Qaeda is unlike most other terrorist groups, which tend to be organized hierarchically—that is, in a rigid pyramidal fashion with a commander at the top issuing orders to the individual cells below. Instead, al-Qaeda was conceived as a flatter, less rigid network. Accordingly, some al-Qaeda operations—especially the most important and spectacular attacks such as those of September 11, the embassy bombings, and the attack on the USS Cole—were likely planned and ordered by bin Laden and the majlis al-shura. However, others—like the shoe bomb attempt and the handheld missile attack—may have been independently carried out by local groups inspired or motivated, but perhaps only indirectly assisted, by bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda is therefore less cohesive in membership than traditionally organized terrorist groups, with a more diffuse and open structure. This flatter, more networked organization is a key strength that likely accounts for the movement’s continued longevity despite the global onslaught directed against it. Individual terrorists or groups under al-Qaeda’s umbrella are able to operate without having specific orders issued from a central command authority. This loose structure means that al-Qaeda does not have one set method of operating or a single, identifiable footprint. This makes it that much harder for military and law enforcement officials to effectively fight and ultimately defeat al-Qaeda.