Gideon v. Wainwright

I

Introduction

Gideon v. Wainwright, important court case of 1963 in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled unanimously that defendants in all felony cases are entitled to legal counsel. Justice Hugo Black wrote the majority opinion (written explanation of the decision) of the Court, which held that if a defendant charged with a serious crime cannot afford an attorney, the government is required to provide one. The Gideon decision overturned a prior Supreme Court case indicating that governments must provide legal counsel only for individuals charged with capital offenses—that is, crimes punishable by death.

II

Gideon and His Case

In 1961 Clarence Earl Gideon, a 51-year-old small-time criminal, was arrested and charged with burglarizing the Bay Harbor Poolroom in Panama City, Florida. When he was brought to court on the charge of burglary, a felony, Gideon informed the judge that he could not afford to hire a lawyer. He asked the court to provide one for him, asserting that 'the Supreme Court of the United States says I am entitled to be represented by counsel.' The trial judge rejected Gideon’s request because the crime with which he was charged was not a capital offense.

During his jury trial, Gideon conducted his own defense. Although Gideon did a fairly good job for a lay person, his defense was weak and he made many legal errors. The jury convicted Gideon of burglary, and the judge gave him the maximum sentence of five years in prison. From prison Gideon filed a handwritten petition to the Florida Supreme Court, asking it to review his conviction. Gideon argued that the trial court had denied him his rights under the Constitution of the United States when it refused to provide him counsel. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this claim without issuing a formal written opinion. In January 1962 Gideon sent a handwritten petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, alleging that he had been denied his federal constitutional rights by the Florida courts.

Gideon's appeal was made in forma pauperis (a Latin term meaning “in the form of a pauper”). Thus, the Court did not require that he pay the normal filing fee, which at the time was $100. Nor did he have to supply the Court with 40 printed copies of his petition, another standard requirement. Although the Court at least considers every petition, most pauperis petitions are rejected. However, after reviewing Gideon’s petition, the Court asked the state of Florida for a formal response to his claim. The Florida attorney general then sent the Court a formal legal brief, arguing that the Court should not hear Gideon's case.

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Florida's response was based mostly on precedents (previous decisions) of the U.S. Supreme Court. When Gideon told the Florida judge that he had a right to a lawyer, he was in fact incorrect. In the case of Powell v. Alabama (1932) the Supreme Court ruled that a poor defendant was entitled to an appointed attorney when charged with a capital offense under state law—for example, murder. In Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) the Court concluded that poor defendants in all federal criminal cases were also guaranteed the right to counsel. However, in Betts v. Brady (1944) the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution did not guarantee a right to appointed counsel for defendants in state trials. In its brief, Florida stated that the Supreme Court should not take Gideon’s case because Florida had been under no legal obligation to provide him with an attorney. In June 1962 the Supreme Court rejected this argument. Instead, the Court agreed to hear Gideon's appeal during formal argument the following year. The Court directed attorneys for both sides to discuss whether the holding (legal rule) in Betts should be reconsidered.

III

Supreme Court Arguments

Gideon had not been able to afford a lawyer in his initial trial, and he could not afford to hire one to take his case to the Supreme Court. However, unlike the trial court, the Supreme Court appointed counsel to represent him. The Court chose Abe Fortas, who was a partner in a well-respected law firm in Washington, D.C., and the personal attorney of the vice president of the United States at that time, Lyndon B. Johnson. (When Johnson later became president, he appointed Fortas to serve on the Supreme Court.) Florida's assistant attorney general, Bruce Robert Jacob, represented Louie L. Wainwright, who as head of the Florida prison system was named as the defendant in the case.

The state of Florida contacted all 50 states, asking for their aid in the case. Florida tried to persuade the other states that convictions of criminals would be more difficult if the Court ruled in Gideon's favor. Florida also argued that the states should oppose Gideon’s petition because they would be required to provide attorneys for poor defendants at taxpayer expense if Gideon prevailed. However, only two states—Alabama and North Carolina—joined Florida in supporting the proposition that states should not be required to provide attorneys for poor criminal defendants. The attorneys general of 22 other states, representing all sections and regions of the country, sent briefs in support of Gideon. One of these briefs came from Walter F. Mondale, then attorney general of Minnesota, who later become vice president of the United States.

IV

The Supreme Court Opinion

The decision in Gideon was based on the Court’s interpretation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The 14th Amendment provides that the states cannot deprive any person of liberty without due process of law—that is, without ensuring certain standards of fundamental fairness. Under this due process requirement, the states are required to guarantee criminal defendants many of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution). One such right, contained in the Sixth Amendment, is the right to assistance of legal counsel. The Sixth Amendment applies explicitly only to defendants who are charged with crimes under federal law, such as treason. However, if assistance of counsel is considered fundamental to due process, then the 14th Amendment would require the states to guarantee the right.

In the Betts decision, the Court determined that the refusal to appoint counsel under the particular circumstances of that case did not infringe on a “fundamental right, essential to a fair trial” and therefore did not amount to a denial of due process. In 1944 Justice Black had dissented (disagreed with the holding) in Betts. Black, a former police court judge from Alabama, was one of the few justices on the Court who had presided over trials in state and local courts. He believed that a criminal trial was fundamentally unfair if a defendant did not have an attorney. In 1963 Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in Gideon, in which the Court overruled Betts. (Although the vote of the Court was unanimous, several justices wrote concurring opinions. A concurring opinion is written when the author agrees with the ruling of the Court but sets forth different reasoning to reach the decision.)

Black stated that the Court in Betts had been wrong when it concluded that the assistance of counsel was not a fundamental right and a necessary part of due process. He also indicated that Betts was a departure from other Court decisions, such as Powell and Johnson. The opinion in Gideon also stressed the importance of legal counsel to make a trial fair. Black noted that the government, understanding that trials require special skills and knowledge, spent a great deal of money hiring lawyers to prosecute criminals. Black urged that the defendant was no less entitled to such representation. According to Black, the noble ideal of a fair trial in which every defendant is equal before the law “cannot be realized if the poor man charged with a crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”

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