Richard Rorty

Richard Rorty (1931-2007), American philosopher, whose work sparked numerous debates regarding the role of philosophy, the foundations of knowledge, and the use of language in philosophy and literature. Rorty was born in New York City and educated at the University of Chicago, where he received a B.A. degree in 1949 and a M.A. degree in 1952, and Yale University, where he received a Ph.D. degree in 1956. From 1961 to 1982 he taught philosophy at Princeton University. In 1982 Rorty became a professor of humanities at the University of Virginia, and in 1998, a professor of comparative literature and philosophy at Stanford University. He had also been the recipient of numerous grants and fellowships, including a MacArthur Fellowship in 1981.

Rorty began as an advocate of linguistic philosophy (see Analytic and Linguistic Philosophy), believing that the tools of logic and the careful analysis of language could provide answers to most philosophical questions. His anthology, The Linguistic Turn (1967), played a major role in defining linguistic philosophy for an entire generation. Rorty later became one of that movement’s most incisive critics. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), he mounted a sustained critique of the idea that the mind mirrors or provides a representation of external reality, or nature. This concept, known as the correspondence theory of truth, is central to linguistic philosophy.

In Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), Rorty abandoned the search for unshakable foundations for human knowledge, a pursuit that has characterized most philosophy since 17th-century French philosopher René Descartes. Instead, Rorty came to favor a pragmatic conception of truth (see Pragmatism) that emphasized the role of the individual in attaining knowledge, at least in part, within the context of various actions. Historical knowledge, for example, he viewed as not simply the accumulation of observed facts about the past; rather, it represents an examination of the past that is shaped according to current concerns, such as human rights or individual autonomy. Thus, the past is fashioned along the lines of present, pragmatic concerns.

Having set aside the representational model of the mind, Rorty began an extended rethinking of the notions of subjectivity and culture. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) and Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (1991), Rorty developed a pragmatic account of what he termed the liberal ironist—the individual whose sense of selfhood is largely an act of self creation. Affirming the importance of individual liberty, Rorty supported the understanding of truth as a relative rather than an absolute concept and argued that the liberal ironist is always aware of the limitations of vocabulary in justifying philosophic positions. Rorty did not seek a foundation for ethical behavior, or moral obligation, beyond the realm of human experience; instead, he appealed to a sense of so-called solidarity based on shared reaction to human suffering. Literature, he argued, often establishes this solidarity much more effectively than philosophy. Viewing philosophy more as a mode of discussion than as a field of study, Rorty avoided presenting any universal philosophical theory. Rather, he offered a series of rich and finely textured ideas about Western intellectual life in the late 20th century.