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Nicaraguan Revolution

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Victorious SandinistasVictorious Sandinistas
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I

Introduction

Nicaraguan Revolution, uprising and civil war, beginning in 1978, that overthrew the long dictatorship of the Somoza family in Nicaragua and replaced it with a leftist government. The rebellion was led by a Marxist guerrilla force, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), known as the Sandinistas. With widespread popular support, the group deposed Anastasio Somoza Debayle and took power in July 1979.

Nicaragua’s new rulers attempted to institute revolutionary political, social, and economic changes. The revolutionary government achieved some success in land reform, literacy, and health programs, but their efforts were hampered by their own inexperience, by severe economic problems, and by strong opposition from the United States. By the mid-1980s the government was focusing on fighting U.S.-supported rebels trying to overthrow it. In 1990, with the economy on the verge of collapse, the Sandinistas lost national elections, ending Nicaragua’s revolutionary experiment but leaving the country fundamentally changed.

II

Background

From 1936 to 1979 Nicaragua was ruled by the Somoza family, Latin America’s longest-lasting dictatorship. Founded by Anastasio Somoza García, family rule had been continued by his sons Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The Somozas were able to stay in power because they controlled the National Guard, the nation’s combined military and police force, which had been created by the United States. The family also cultivated U.S. support for their regime, naming the capital’s main street for President Franklin D. Roosevelt and letting the Central Intelligence Agency use Nicaragua as a base for launching the unsuccessful 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

The Somozas used their power to make themselves the richest family in Central America, controlling much of Nicaragua’s wealth for their own benefit and profiting by corruption. Their rule provided stability that contributed to impressive economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, but the majority of Nicaragua’s people did not share in this progress and lived in conditions of extreme poverty. Those who opposed the Somozas were often imprisoned, exiled, tortured, or killed. Political repression and corruption worsened after Anastasio Somoza Debayle became president in 1967.



The extent and cost of the Somozas’ corrupt rule became clear when an earthquake devastated Managua, Nicaragua’s capital, in 1972. As many as 10,000 people died in the earthquake, hundreds of thousands more were left homeless, and much of the city was destroyed. The Somozas and the National Guard stole relief funds and made huge profits by speculating in land used to house desperate refugees. Their actions, combined with worsening economic conditions, convinced most Nicaraguans that a change of government was needed.

The major group trying to overthrow the Somoza government was the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). It was founded in 1961 by a small group of university students, headed by Carlos Fonseca, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge. They received encouragement and support from Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro, in part because of the Somozas’ role in the Bay of Pigs invasion. While influenced by Marxist and Leninist ideology (see Communism), the FSLN had no direct ties to Nicaragua’s Communist Party. They took their name from Augusto Sandino, a Nicaraguan general who led a guerrilla campaign against U.S. intervention in the country from 1927 to 1933 and was murdered by Somoza’s National Guard in 1934. The Sandinistas opposed the Somozas and U.S. influence over Nicaragua, and called for radical social and political change to redistribute wealth and power. They gained support among some rural Nicaraguans and students, but their early efforts at guerrilla warfare were defeated by the National Guard, costing both Fonseca and Mayorga their lives.

Other Nicaraguans who tried to oust the Somozas also failed. By the 1970s prominent business leaders and Catholic Church officials joined the criticism of the Somoza regime. Most of the political opposition formed a united front headed by Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of La Prensa, the nation’s largest newspaper. Increasingly, they concentrated their efforts on influencing U.S. policy to force Somoza from power. They found support from Democrats in the U.S. Congress and, beginning in 1977, from the administration of President Jimmy Carter, whose foreign policy emphasized respect for human rights.

III

The Revolution

In January 1978 Chamorro was assassinated in Managua, probably by associates of Somoza. This set off weeks of anti-government riots and demonstrations, a national strike, and scattered efforts at armed uprisings. While Somoza maintained control, his regime was shaken, and international opposition began to grow. In August a group of Sandinista commandos, led by Edén Pastora, known as Commandante Zero, seized Managua’s National Palace, taking many members of the Nicaraguan Congress as hostages. Through negotiations, the Sandinistas won the release of many FSLN prisoners, a ransom, publication of their call for the population to rebel, and safe passage out of the country for the commandos.

The Sandinistas’ successful raid encouraged anti-Somoza forces, and uprisings broke out across the country. Somoza’s troops defeated these with great brutality, bombing and shelling civilian neighborhoods. The government’s actions caused hundreds of Nicaraguans to join the FSLN and brought increased international pressures for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. A U.S.-sponsored effort at mediation collapsed, leaving the moderate political opposition discredited for negotiating with the dictatorship. To most Nicaraguans, even middle-class and business interests, the Sandinistas appeared to be the only alternative to continuing rule by the Somoza regime. The United States imposed limited economic sanctions against Somoza, but more important, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Panama began covertly supporting the Sandinistas.

In May 1979 fighting broke out again as the Sandinistas announced a final offensive and called for a nationwide rebellion. This time the National Guard could not control the situation, and the rebels took large areas of the country. Battles were fought in major cities, including León, Masaya, and Managua, where National Guard planes bombed neighborhoods where people supported the Sandinistas. An emergency meeting of the Organization of American States called on Somoza to resign, rejecting a U.S. call to send peacekeeping troops to Nicaragua. The United States tried to negotiate a transition to a broad coalition government and to preserve some parts of the National Guard, but that effort failed. With much of the nation in Sandinista hands and with Managua surrounded, Somoza fled into exile, and the once-powerful National Guard disintegrated. On July 19, Sandinista forces marched into Managua and took control of the country.

IV

Revolutionary Government

The new Sandinista government was led by a five-member junta, or council, installed by the FSLN. Headed by Sandinista military commander Daniel Ortega Saavedra, it included two other Sandinista officials and two non-Sandinistas: businessman Alfonso Robelo Callejas and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of slain newspaper editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. A broad-based cabinet was established, with a majority of non-Sandinistas, and plans were announced for an appointed Council of State, made up of representatives from political parties and worker, business, women’s, and other groups. The Coucil of State would function as a legislature until elections were held.

However, it quickly became clear that real power was not held by the formal government, but by the nine Sandinista commanders who made up the FSLN’s National Directorate. Within a year Robelo and Violeta Chamorro left the junta, and the Council of State was reorganized to guarantee an overwhelming Sandinista majority. Elections were postponed, restrictions were placed on the media, and relations with the Roman Catholic Church became increasingly tense. Two non-Sandinistas replaced Robelo and Chamorro on the junta, but they had little power, and the government’s relations with opposition political parties and the private business sector deteriorated.

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