Supreme Court of the United States

XV

Effects of the Court’s Decisions

The Supreme Court declares constitutional and legal rights, but it has no force to compel obedience to its decisions. Other branches of government have from time to time failed to comply with constitutional rules. In a few instances the government and private citizens actively resisted both the letter and spirit of the Court’s rulings. For example, Southern states followed a policy of massive resistance to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), refusing to proceed with the Court’s order to desegregate public schools.

Yet to a remarkable degree, sooner or later other branches of the federal government and state and municipal authorities fall into line, for several reasons. First, there has been a broad historical consensus that Supreme Court decisions are to be respected, so that public opinion in most instances will eventually turn against other branches that resist a Supreme Court ruling, prompting changed public policy through elections. Second, to a large extent the Court itself abides by its own decisions. This principle, known as stare decisis—let the decision stand—tends to make the law consistent and predictable, discouraging people from defying a ruling by hoping that they can go back to the Court to secure a different ruling. Third, other courts, both state and federal, are bound to follow the Supreme Court’s decisions on constitutional and federal law. Officials and private citizens alike who fail to abide by the logic of a decided case can thus be brought back to court.

The principle of stare decisis does not stop the Supreme Court from altering or overturning its own legal precedents. On occasion the Court has dramatically departed from what seemed a settled precedent. In one case the Court waited just three years before it issued a new ruling. The Court ruled in 1940 in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, by an 8-1 vote, that a public school can require schoolchildren to salute the flag, even though doing so violates their religious beliefs. For three years, members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses were subject to threats and in some cases physical violence and even death for their continued resistance. In 1943 in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court admitted its error and overruled the Gobitis case by a 6-3 vote. It said that freedom of speech means that the government cannot force people to express their beliefs.

Sometimes the reversal of a precedent can cause sweeping changes in American society. In 1937, for example, the Court ruled in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation that Congress could regulate activities that had even an indirect effect on interstate commerce. This was one of a series of cases that moved the Court away from its longstanding view that Congress had only limited power to intervene in the economy. The reversal of 19th-century precedents on the issue paved the way for Court approval of minimum wage regulations in the Fair Labor Standards Act, old-age pensions in the Social Security Act, and many other elements of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies of the 1930s.

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Whether the Court’s rulings will be accepted depends in part on how far the Court departs from public opinion. Some critics object when they perceive the Court as pursuing an “activist” agenda, rather than simply interpreting the Constitution. The Court comes under even heavier fire when it appears that justices are writing their own values into the Constitution. Quite often the critics who object to an activist Court are politically conservative, and those who favor judicial activism support liberal politics. But judicial activism and conservatism do not always reflect a liberal-conservative political split. Critics of the Court’s expansion of procedural rights for criminal defendants in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, attacked the decisions as activist and politically liberal. On the other hand, critics of the Court’s suppression of the government’s power to regulate commerce in the 1920s complained that those decisions were activist and politically conservative.

XVI

History

Since the early 19th century the Supreme Court has played a central role in resolving many of the country’s most difficult problems. The Court has dealt with the issue of slavery and racism, the power of the federal government over the states, the role of the government in the economy, abortion, the rights of people accused of crimes, and many other complex issues. The Court’s decisions have often stirred controversy, and those who disagree with its rulings have sometimes called its authority into question. Still, through most of its history the Supreme Court has stood as one of the most respected and trusted institutions in the United States.

A

Origins

The Supreme Court heard few cases in its early years, and played a rather insignificant role in the political system. During the 1790s, three chief justices served only brief terms, and several nominees turned down presidential appointments. When the nation’s capital moved to Washington, D.C., in 1800, the Court did not initially have its own building. The justices had to conduct sessions in a series of temporary venues that included a congressional committee room, a Library of Congress office, and a courtroom built in the Capitol basement. These meager facilities failed to reflect the Court’s increased stature after John Marshall became chief justice in 1801. Marshall served on the Court for 34 years, still one of the longest tenures, and transformed the Court into a potent engine of the national government. In 1803 in Marbury v. Madison, he announced the doctrine of judicial review, and his opinion was given as that of the entire Court rather than, as had been the custom, the opinion of a single justice.

In many other significant decisions, Marshall read the Constitution broadly to establish a wide scope of federal power for both Congress and the Court itself. Most significant was the 1819 decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, which defined congressional power quite broadly. Marshall held that the Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution permitted Congress to establish a national bank, even though no such power was expressly stated in the Constitution. In the same case the Court established the supremacy of the federal government by barring the states from taxing any part of the federal government. In 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court broadened congressional power under the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, laying the groundwork for extensive federal regulation of interstate commerce.

The Court under Marshall also claimed strong authority over the states by asserting its right to overturn state laws. In 1810 in Fletcher v. Peck, for example, the Court ruled that the Contracts Clause in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution barred some state attempts at regulating economic activity. In 1819 the Marshall Court gave private corporations protection from state regulations in Dartmouth College v. Woodward (See Dartmouth College Case). In both of these cases the Supreme Court served notice that the states could not pass laws that conflicted with the federal Constitution, and that the Court would be the judge of such conflicts. But during Marshall’s final years as chief justice in the 1830s, the Court recognized limits on federal power as well. In 1833 the Court ruled in Barron v. Baltimore, for example, that the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the Constitution) applied only to the federal government and not to the states.

B

Commerce, Slavery, and Civil War

By the 1830s the Court was forced to confront the issues raised by the country’s rapid industrialization. As industry replaced agriculture, the Court under the leadership of Roger Brooke Taney sought to define the appropriate economic role for state and federal government. Early in Taney’s term the Court confirmed the power of states to manage industrial development. In the 1837 case Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, the Court ruled that Massachusetts could enact a law that hurt some economic interests if it encouraged long-term economic growth overall. The Court decided in Swift v. Tyson in 1842 that federal courts had authority to develop general commercial law when the citizens of different states had legal conflicts, and the decision stood until 1938 when the Court said such authority belonged only to the states.

In 1848 in West River Bridge v. Dix, the Court upheld the states’ constitutional authority to curb corporations—their power of eminent domain—as long as they paid just compensation for what they took. This case greatly aided the rapid growth of the new railroads. In Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh (1852) the Court reversed a Marshall decision and expanded the reach of federal jurisdiction over the inland waterways. The Court also prevented the states from interfering with the development of steamships.

Although the Supreme Court’s decisions in the first half of the 19th century helped the economy, that Court would forever be condemned in history’s eyes because of its position on slavery. Four of the Court’s nine members were from slave states, and only Justice John McLean clearly opposed slavery. The Court issued several proslavery opinions, including the notorious case of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), which most historians consider a major step toward the Civil War (1861-1865). In the Dred Scott case, a slave owner hoped to secure an opinion from the Court declaring that slaves who escaped to free states did not automatically become free.

The Court could have limited its opinion to a narrow reading of Scott’s right to sue in federal court, but instead went much further. First, the Court ruled that the federal government had no authority to control slavery in federal territories before they became states, even though Congress had done just that in the Missouri Compromise of 1820. It was the first time since Marbury v. Madison that the Court had overturned a federal law as unconstitutional. Second, the Court denied that even free blacks could be citizens of the United States. The Court seemed to say that not even free states could prohibit slavery, thus making political solutions and compromise among the states virtually impossible. Chief Justice Taney thought that he had resolved the issue of slavery once and for all. In a sense the Court had settled the issue, but only by sending the nation into civil war. The northern reaction to the Dred Scott case led directly to Abraham Lincoln’s election as the first Republican president, the South’s secession, and the war that ended slavery. Some blame for the American Civil War certainly falls on the failed political leadership in the White House and Congress, but the Supreme Court merits criticism as well.

C

From Reconstruction to the New Deal

Chief Justice Taney died in 1864, leaving the Court just as it faced Reconstruction—the process of rebuilding the South’s tattered economic and political structures. The Congress, dominated by northern Republicans, enacted strong laws that permitted military government in the South until new state governments could be put into place. The Court limited some efforts of the federal government to govern by military tribunals. In Ex parte Milligan in 1866 it refused to permit military trials of civilians as long as the civil courts were open. But the Court also upheld other Reconstruction laws and refused to bar President Andrew Johnson from enforcing them. The Court showed great restraint when Congress stripped it of jurisdiction to hear a case challenging the constitutionality of a Reconstruction act. Even though the case was pending, the Court agreed in Ex parte McCardle in 1869 that if Congress limited the Court’s jurisdiction according to the Constitution, the Court would be powerless to act. This decision alleviated fears that the Court was determined to rule Reconstruction unconstitutional. By supporting Reconstruction, the Court helped the country recover from the social and economic destruction of the Civil War.

By 1870 the Court had to confront the new constitutional issues created by the states’ ratification of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution. The most pressing issue was: Since these constitutional amendments gave African Americans the right to freedom from slavery, did they also give blacks other civil rights protections? Congress assumed that the amendments did grant African Americans new rights and enacted several laws designed to protect civil rights through the federal courts. These laws seemed to threaten the historic balance between state and federal power, which the Supreme Court was reluctant to upset. In the so-called slaughterhouse cases in 1873, the Court took a narrow view of the 14th Amendment. A broad application of the amendment, the Court reasoned, would make the High Court a “perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states” whenever a civil right was at stake. In this and other decisions, the Court showed that it was unwilling to disrupt the balance of power between state and federal governments despite the 14th Amendment, which commanded change to ensure nationwide racial equality and due process of law. The Court also showed that it was unwilling to disrupt the racial status quo.

The Court’s failure to make good on the Constitution’s promise of equality reflected a widespread persistence of racism in American society and institutions. In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Court ruled that Congress had no authority to impose a national ban on discrimination in public accommodations such as theaters, restaurants, and hotels. The Court did strike down state laws that explicitly discriminated against blacks, as in Strauder v. West Virginia in 1880 when it ruled against juries that excluded blacks. But the Court had backed away from even modest protections by the end of the 19th century. In 1896 the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson upheld the racial segregation of public facilities provided that they were “separate but equal,” a notorious position from which it began to retreat only in the 1940s.

By the early 20th century, many American citizens and political leaders backed the reforms of the Progressive movement, which advocated limits on large businesses and more rights for workers and consumers. The Supreme Court, however, sharply reined in the efforts of both the state and federal governments to regulate the economy. Strong pressure for national economic regulation led to some victories for Congress, but the Court generally denied Congress the power to break up certain monopolies and take other steps to improve market competition. In addition the Court adopted a doctrine of economic due process that made it more difficult for the government to regulate business and property rights. In 1905, for example, the Court ruled in Lochner v. New York that the state could not regulate the working hours of bakery workers. The Court reasoned that it could invalidate any “unreasonable” interference with the “liberty of contract.” Lochner and related cases created substantive due process, a new class of basic constitutional rights that was initially used to overturn minimum wage legislation and trade union protections.

The Supreme Court continued to limit state and federal involvement in the economy through the 1920s and into the Great Depression, the economic hard times of the 1930s. The restrictions at first hobbled the efforts of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to enact the New Deal, a program of economic reforms and government projects intended to confront the Depression. Roosevelt tried to get the New Deal through by “packing” the Court—expanding the membership so that he could appoint justices open to his philosophy. Congress refused to expand the size of the Court, but the Court's justices soon eased restrictions on Roosevelt's programs. In a sharp about-face, the Court sustained far-reaching trade union and workplace regulations in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel in 1937. The Court soon used the federal commerce power to grant virtually unlimited authority to Congress to regulate whatever affected interstate commerce. The Court also rejected the doctrine of economic due process. By the 1940s, a new set of justices, all but one appointed by Roosevelt, had remade constitutional law dealing with economic matters.

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