Russia

J

5

The Weakness of the State

Matters were made much worse by the Russian government’s inability to carry out the most basic functions of any state, namely the preservation of order and the collection of taxes. The emergence of small businesses, considered necessary for a capitalist economy, was made difficult by rampant criminal activity, corrupt officials, and arbitrary and exorbitant taxes. The tax system was so erratic and inefficient that the revenues needed to sustain the armed forces and basic welfare services were not collected. Medical services collapsed and life expectancy, particularly of males, fell dramatically. Meanwhile, a number of well-placed individuals made vast fortunes by turning assets previously owned by the state into their private property. Unable to collect revenues sufficient to fund even its most basic requirements, the state was forced to borrow more and more on domestic and international markets.

J

6

Political Scene

Russia’s political scene was unstable and conflict-ridden in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In December 1992 the driving force behind the economic reforms known as shock therapy, Yegor Gaydar, was forced out of office by opposition in the legislature. His successor, Viktor Chernomyrdin, was the former head of the natural-gas industry of the Soviet Union; this increased his acceptance by key conservatives. Chernomyrdin pursued basically the same policies as Gaydar but made more concessions to powerful economic and political interests. Nevertheless, no lasting compromise could be achieved between Yeltsin and his supporters on the one hand, and the legislature on the other. In the absence of clear constitutional provisions to delineate powers and resolve conflicts between executive and legislature, the issue was settled by force in October 1993. When Yeltsin dissolved the parliament in September, armed opposition leaders and conservative deputies occupied the parliament building and refused to disband. Troops loyal to Yeltsin stormed the building and arrested the opposition leaders, leaving more than 100 dead.

Yeltsin subsequently drew up a new constitution, which was accepted by the electorate in a December 1993 referendum. Under the new constitution the president’s powers were greatly enhanced at the legislature’s expense; this enabled Yeltsin to accelerate his program of economic reform and to mount his invasion of Chechnya despite parliamentary opposition. Both the December 1993 and December 1995 elections gave Yeltsin’s opponents, the communists and the Russian nationalists, the majority of seats in the legislature. In the more crucial 1996 presidential election, however, Yeltsin defeated his communist opponent, Gennady Zyuganov, a former senior Soviet bureaucrat. Yeltsin’s victory was helped by his alliance with financial interests that controlled the media. Zyuganov’s party was stronger on nostalgia for Soviet days than on realistic answers to Russia’s current problems. In choosing Yeltsin the electorate showed its continued dislike for much of the former communist era, its disbelief that old times could be restored, and its preference for the stability and continuity that Yeltsin represented.

In March 1998 Yeltsin unexpectedly dismissed Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and the rest of his cabinet. Yeltsin then appointed Sergey Kiriyenko, a young reformist with limited central government experience, as prime minister. Russia’s failing economy continued its steep decline, and in mid-1998 Yeltsin dismissed Kiriyenko and attempted to reinstate Chernomyrdin. Parliament rejected Chernomyrdin’s return as prime minister, approving Yeltsin’s compromise choice, foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, in September. Primakov acquired significant power beginning in October 1998 after a series of illnesses left Yeltsin unable to handle many of his duties. In May 1999 Yeltsin dismissed Primakov, criticizing him for failing to revive Russia’s economy. Many observers said Yeltsin objected to Primakov’s growing popularity. A week later, Russia’s parliament approved Yeltsin’s choice for Primakov’s successor, interior minister and Yeltsin loyalist Sergey Stepashin.

---

---

Stepashin did not last long. In August, Yeltsin dismissed him, along with the rest of the cabinet, and named Vladimir Putin, the head of Russia’s domestic intelligence service, as Stepashin’s replacement. Yeltsin stated that when his term ended in July 2000, he wanted Putin to succeed him as president. To some observers the selection and endorsement of Putin, a loyal Yeltsin ally, signaled an attempt by Yeltsin to ensure his succession by a friendly replacement.

Yeltsin resigned unexpectedly on December 31, 1999, and named Putin acting president. Yeltsin said he was stepping down to make room for a younger generation of political leaders. The timing of Yeltsin’s resignation, which came six months before his second term formally ended, appeared designed to boost Putin’s chances of winning an early presidential election. The decision to resign may also have been linked to Yeltsin’s poor health.

J

7

Recent Developments

In the presidential election held in March 2000, Putin was elected to a full term as president, winning almost 53 percent of the vote. Putin’s control over the government strengthened with the overwhelming victory of his United Russia Party in the December 2003 parliamentary elections. International election observers called the election “free but unfair” because Putin and his allies enjoyed a virtual monopoly on television coverage. Early in his term, Putin had placed independent television stations under government control.

Putin easily won reelection in March 2004 with 71 percent of the vote. His closest rival, the communist candidate, won only 14 percent of the vote. Russian voters appeared to credit Putin with transforming the Russian economy, which saw growth of at least 5 percent in the gross domestic product (GDP) in each year of Putin’s first term. International election observers and pro-democracy forces within Russia were again critical of Putin’s control over the state-run media, noting that media coverage showed a “clear bias” in favor of Putin and that other candidates had little access to the media.

Russia held parliamentary elections in late 2007. International election observers criticized the election as “unfair” due to Putin’s continued control of the media, as well as several reforms to the country’s electoral law that weakened the position of opposition parties. Changes to the electoral law included banning independents from running as candidates; increasing the minimum membership required of a party for it to be officially registered; and increasing the required percentage of votes to 7 percent (from 5 percent) for a party to gain representation. According to official election results, the pro-Putin United Russia party and its allies won nearly three-quarters of the seats in the State Duma. The Communist Party comprised the only remaining opposition in the Russian parliament. Liberal parties that had been excluded or were unable to pass the required threshold warned that Russia was on its way to again becoming a single-party, totalitarian state. However, Putin continued to enjoy widespread support, as a majority of Russians credited his strong leadership for improving the country.

A presidential election was due in March 2008. Putin, barred by the constitution from running for a third consecutive presidential term, endorsed his protégé, Dmitri Medvedev, as his successor. Putin announced that he intended to become prime minister, indicating he would continue to wield considerable influence. During the presidential campaign, opposition candidates received scant attention in the state-controlled media and opposition rallies were subject to police crackdowns. Few international observers were present to monitor the election due to severe restrictions imposed on their work by the Russian government. Buoyed by Putin’s popularity and a sidelined opposition, Medvedev won a landslide victory with 70 percent of the popular vote.

Dominic Lieven contributed the History section of this article.

	More from Encarta
	•  Presidential Myths Quiz •  Coffee break: Recharge your brain