Lyndon B. Johnson

B

2

Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

High on Johnson’s foreign policy priorities were his efforts to improve relations between the United States and the USSR. He increased the trade, cultural, and economic exchange programs that had been started during the Kennedy administration, and in 1968 direct passenger flights began between Moscow and New York City.

Johnson’s efforts were moderately successful. In the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which the USSR supported the Arab countries and the United States supported Israel, a potentially destructive situation was avoided by the careful diplomacy exercised by both the Johnson administration and the Soviets. In a situation that could have triggered a much larger war, the leaders of the two great powers were able to come to a mutual understanding that, in effect, banked the fires in the Middle East, at least temporarily (see Six-Day War). Less than a month after the crisis, in fact, relations between the two countries were such that Johnson and Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin were able to meet at a summit conference held at Glassboro, New Jersey. Although no specific agreements were made at that meeting, both leaders stated that they considered it a success and that it had contributed to better relations between the USSR and the United States.

Other important agreements that the Johnson administration made with the USSR include the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, agreed upon in 1968; a treaty, signed in 1967, whereby the parties agreed to ban nuclear weapons from outer space; and an agreement by the two countries to assist and repatriate any astronauts who might land by accident on the other country’s territory.

Near the end of the Johnson administration, relations between the two countries cooled somewhat as the result of the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and four of its Warsaw Pact allies.

---

---

B

3

Caribbean Crises

Johnson was vitally concerned with the Caribbean area, and he relied on an old Texas friend, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann, for advice about the region. The first Caribbean crisis occurred in the Panama Canal Zone in January 1964. American officials had agreed to fly the Panamanian flag in places within the Canal Zone, as a gesture toward Panamanian nationalism. When U.S. students at a high school refused to fly Panama’s flag, Panamanian students marched to the school and a confrontation took place. Riots then broke out, in which U.S. soldiers fired on protestors. In response, Panama broke diplomatic relations with the United States and protested to the United Nations Security Council and the Organization of American States (OAS). Within a few hours a truce was worked out, but it was many months before good feeling was restored. In September 1965 Johnson announced that the two countries had agreed in principle to renegotiate the 1903 treaty that had established the Canal Zone. The new treaty would, at least, provide for integration of the area into Panama, with joint operation of the canal.

The other major Caribbean crisis in the early years of the Johnson administration occurred in the Dominican Republic. In April 1965 supporters of the exiled president Juan Bosch attempted to take over the government. Although businessleaders and landholders disliked his reforms, Bosch had won an overwhelming victory in his country’s first free election. He had been ousted in 1963 by the military, who resisted the effort to restore Bosch, and civil war followed. Johnson, apparently decided that the coup was Communist-inspired, and after announcing that there would be “no more Castros” (referring to the Communist leader of Cuba, Fidel Castro) ordered U.S. Marines to the Dominican Republic. An OAS commission worked out a truce in May, and a peace force containing U.S. troops remained in the republic. In June 1966 new elections resulted in the defeat of Bosch by Joaquín Balaguer, who did not favor reform. Many believed that Johnson had overreacted in 1965 and that the use of U.S. troops would be harmful to U.S. relations with all of Latin America. By 1968, however, the Balaguer government had established a minimum level of stability.

C

The Vietnam War

It was in Southeast Asia that Johnson ran into his greatest difficulties. The Vietnam War, a military struggle fought in Vietnam from 1959 to 1975, had begun when Communist-led nationalists rose in opposition to the government of South Vietnam. They sought the reunification of Vietnam, which had been temporarily divided in 1954 by the Geneva Accords. These nationalists formed the National Liberation Front (NLF), which was supported by the Communist government of North Vietnam. The struggle widened into a war between South Vietnam and North Vietnam and ultimately into a conflict involving other nations in Southeast Asia. Unlike conventional wars, the war in Vietnam had no defined front lines. Much of it consisted of hit-and-run attacks, with the NLF guerrilla fighters striking at government outposts and retreating into the jungle.

Johnson had inherited a pledge from the Eisenhower administration that the United States would not permit South Vietnam to fall to the Communists. He had also inherited a commitment of several thousand U.S. “advisers” in South Vietnam from the Kennedy administration.

C

1

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

In 1964 Johnson reported that the North Vietnamese had attacked U.S. vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin and asked Congress for a resolution to increase U.S. military involvement. The measure was passed by both houses. In February 1965 U.S. planes began regular bombing raids over North Vietnam. Johnson stopped the bombing in May to support peace talks, but when North Vietnam rejected all negotiations, the bombings were resumed. U.S. troop strength continued to increase in South Vietnam. On March 6, 1965, a brigade of American marines landed at Ðà Nang, and by year’s end U.S. combat strength was nearly 200,000.

While continuing the military buildup in Vietnam, Johnson made another attempt to end the war. In December 1965 he again halted the bombing of North Vietnam in an effort to achieve a peaceful settlement. Again negotiations failed, and the raids were resumed. In June 1966 U.S. planes began bombing targets near Hanoi, the capitol of North Vietnam, and the neighboring port of Haiphong, both of which had previously been spared.

In October 1966 representatives from the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines—which all had troops in South Vietnam—met in Manila and promised to withdraw within six months if North Vietnam abandoned the war. The offer was rejected by North Vietnam. In June 1967, when Johnson met with Soviet Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey, he unsuccessfully sought Kosygin’s help in bringing North Vietnam to the peace table.

The war continued, and casualty figures rose. In November 1967 the Defense Department announced that total U.S. casualties in Vietnam since the beginning of 1961 had reached 15,058 killed and 109,527 wounded. With the mounting toll sentiment grew within the United States for an end to the war, the cost of which, apart from the loss of life, was estimated by the president at $25 billion per year. A peace movement developed and gathered momentum, and marches were organized against the war in major U.S. cities (see Pacifism).

C

2

The Tet Offensive

In December 1967 Johnson visited foreign capitals in search of support for his war policies, announcing “The enemy cannot win, now, in Vietnam.” A month later, however, the NLFlaunched the Tet Offensive (from the name of the Vietnamese lunar new year in mid-February), a coordinated series of attacks on more than 100 South Vietnamese targets that almost cut South Vietnam in half. Despite its psychological effect, the campaign failed, and the Communist forces were driven back from most of the positions they had gained, having lost 85,000 of their best troops.

In spite of this U.S. victory, however, by the early spring of 1968 much of the American public had concluded that the war was unwinnable. Repeated predictions of victory from U.S. generals and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had proved wrong, and as the U.S. commitment grew, so did opposition to the war and to Johnson personally. By 1967 Johnson began avoiding public appearances because of demonstrations and threats to his life.

	More from Encarta
	•  Important Notice: MSN Encarta to be discontinued. Learn more. •  Presidential Myths Quiz •  Coffee break: Recharge your brain