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That the Democratic Party would nominate Johnson for president in 1964 was never in doubt, in spite of signs of support for Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and of a substantial protest vote cast in the Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland primaries for the governor of Alabama, George Wallace. Wallace believed that the federal government should not intervene in the affairs of the individual states, particularly not to change the states’ segregation policies, which were designed to separate black and white people. Johnson supporters controlled all delegations to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, except those of a few Southern states. The only excitement provided by the president came in the way he announced his choice of a running mate. On July 30 Johnson said “... it would be inadvisable for me to recommend to the convention any member of my Cabinet or any of those who meet regularly with the Cabinet.” He thereupon specifically mentioned six of those thereby eliminated, notably Attorney General Kennedy and Adlai E. Stevenson, ambassador to the United Nations. At the convention late in August, Johnson introduced his choice for vice president, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, who was nominated by acclamation. Much of the burden of the actual campaigning fell on Humphrey, who had entered the Senate with Johnson in 1949 and had risen to the position of majority whip. Humphrey had built the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of his state and served as mayor of Minneapolis. He had attracted national attention when he convinced the 1948 Democratic National Convention to take a strong stand in favor of civil rights. He was a magnetic, highly energetic person, an expert in debate, as well as in campaign oratory, and a great favorite of Northern liberals. He was also a close personal friend of the president. Each man had had a considerable measure of success in winning over his own associates to friendship for the other.
It is not surprising that Johnson, a veteran of single-party election campaigning, should have run in 1964 as what might be termed a consensus candidate, a candidate who appealed to a large majority of the population. Like his idol, Franklin Roosevelt, he yearned to be “president of all the people.” Even Humphrey, who was used to the cut and thrust of the intense two-party politics of Minnesota, became something of a consensus politician before the 1964 campaign was over. The character of their opponents on the Republican ticket, Senator Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona and Congressman William Miller of New York, was responsible in part for the kind of campaign the Democrats waged. Democratic slogans were generalities like “Prosperity,””Unity,” and “Peace.” Moreover, it was able to point with pride to the legislative record of Congress and with sorrow to the tragic loss of the young president who had pledged to attempt so much. Johnson was at the center of the campaign, directing it with his usual vigor and close attention to detail, concentrating on independent and Republican voters. Meanwhile, the Republicans were floundering. Goldwater, as an experienced party fund-raising speaker and three-time head of the Senate Republican Campaign Committee, was accustomed to addressing the party faithful. He had long known that most of these devout Republican workers shared his own conservative views: his doubts about the United Nations, social security, and the federal income tax. From the time of the February primary in New Hampshire, which he lost, to the June primary in California, which he won, Goldwater continued to express these conservative views. At the Republican National Convention more moderate or pragmatic Republicans had been unable to prevent Goldwater’s nomination. These Republican challengers had accused Goldwater of being too extreme in his policy recommendations. In his acceptance speech at the convention, Goldwater indicated that he was going to carry on a campaign that would give the voters, in the words of a current slogan, “a choice, not an echo.” He also said, “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! ... Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!” Thus, he defied those in his own party who wanted to base the campaign on more moderate policy positions that they believed would appeal to most voters. More from Encarta In retrospect, it seems clear that the election of Johnson over Goldwater was almost unavoidable. Even so, Johnson made heroic efforts to win by as wide a margin as possible. Leading Republicans were courted and some of them won over. By the end of the campaign only four major newspapers, the Chicago Tribune, the Cincinnati Enquirer, the Los Angeles Times, and the Oakland Tribune supported Goldwater. Senator Humphrey’s whirlwind campaign portrayed Goldwater as an enemy of social legislation and as a trigger-happy militarist. Humphrey emphasized Goldwater’s votes against the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Johnson, meanwhile, campaigned as “President of All the People.” As the journalist Theodore White put it, “Never were Republicans denounced as such; the opposition was involved in its own civil war, and the president obeyed Napoleon’s maxim: ‘Never interfere with the enemy when he is in the process of destroying himself.’” The result was an enormous landslide. The greatest popular-vote margin ever won in modern U.S. history, 61 percent, went to Johnson. Goldwater carried only five states of the South and his own Arizona. Vermont voted for a Democratic candidate for president for the first time since the Republican Party came into being, and by a margin of two to one. Democrats increased their membership in the Senate from 66 to 68 and in the House from 259 to 295. A number of promising Republican candidates went down to defeat, despite the efforts of some of them to avoid being tabbed extremists. The day following the elections found the Republican Party in a sad state of disarray.
Johnson’s domestic program for his own term, as he apparently liked to think of it, was built around the concept of the Great Society. He had used this expression from time to time, but he had not emphasized it until he gave a speech at the University of Michigan on May 22, 1964. In this address, which preceded the party conventions, Johnson described his plans to solve pressing problems: “We are going to assemble the best thought and broadest knowledge from all over the world to find these answers. I intend to establish working groups to prepare a series of conferences and meetings—on the cities, on natural beauty, on the quality of education, and on other emerging challenges. From these studies, we will begin to set our course toward the Great Society.” Soon afterward he told reporters, “I’m going to get the best minds in the country to work for me.” Almost immediately 14 separate task forces began thoroughly studying nearly all major aspects of United States society, each working without publicity while it did its job. Presidential assistants Bill Moyers and Richard N. Goodwin helped create these groups, drawing on the expertise of other government officials in selecting the members. During June the task forces were recruited. The average membership was nine, and particular care was taken to include governmental experts, as well as academicians. Each task force was assigned a particular subject: cooperation among government agencies in dealing with financial questions; making the federal government more efficient and less costly; developing policies to prevent economic recessions; developing policies on economic issues related to other countries; and determining how best to help individuals maintain their income. It is notable that only one of these task forces dealt with foreign policy. Many of Kennedy’s committees had dealt with foreign affairs, and he had encountered political problems when their proposals were leaked to the press. The task-force reports, drawn up separately, were turned in to the White House. Moyers then circulated them to the agencies concerned and set up a new group of committees of government officials to evaluate the various recommendations. Experts on relations with Congress were also drawn into the deliberations to get the best advice on persuading the Congress to pass the legislation. Finally, the president went over the refined recommendations at his ranch with Moyers and Budget Director Kermit Gordon. Many specific proposals were included in brief form in Johnson’s State of the Union address delivered on January 7, 1965. A number of these proposals became laws. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 was the first broad federal aid given to education in U.S. history, allotting more than $1 billion to help schools purchase materials and start special education programs. The Higher Education Act that same year increased federal money given to universities and created scholarships and low-interest loans for students. The Medical Care Act of 1965 authorized a program, called Medicare, that covered most hospital and nursing costs, as well as another plan to help with the medical expenses of the needy regardless of age. The so-called Model Cities Act of 1966 approved $1.2 billion to improve housing, recreation areas, health, and education in economically depressed areas of cities across the country. In addition, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to assure minority registration and voting. The law suspended use of literacy or other voter-qualification tests that had sometimes served to keep blacks off voting lists and provided for federal court lawsuits to stop discriminatory poll taxes. It also reinforced the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by authorizing the appointment of federal voting examiners in areas that did not meet voter-participation requirements. Some of the credit for the success of Johnson’s domestic programs must be given to the secret task forces, although most must go to the virtually tireless president, one of the few true masters of congressional politics ever to occupy the White House.
Lyndon Johnson was an unabashed patriot, a fervent advocate of military preparedness, and a firm supporter of the foreign commitments of the United States. On November 27, 1963, in his first address to Congress as president, he pledged: “This nation will keep its commitments from South Vietnam to West Berlin. We will be unceasing in the search for peace; resourceful in our pursuit of areas of agreement, even with those with whom we differ; and generous and loyal to those who join with us in common cause.”
Johnson’s European policy was essentially a continuation of Kennedy’s policy. Warm friendship with Britain and its prime ministers was balanced by coolness toward France and its enigmatic president, Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle had refused to sign the Test Ban Treaty; insisted on keeping Britain out of the European Common Market, an organization of European nations to promote economic cooperation (see European Union); demanded the removal from French soil of the elaborate and expensive facilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), thus, in effect, taking France out of that organization; and criticized U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. Johnson was clearly not very fond of de Gaulle and his policies, but he reacted calmly to them, perhaps because he was not certain that de Gaulle needed to be taken very seriously.
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