Iraq

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Political Developments Under al-Maliki

In political developments the Iraq parliament passed a federalism measure in October 2006 that would allow provinces to join together in autonomous regions. The measure was backed by the UIA, which was headed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the SIIC, formerly SCIRI. It was opposed by al-Maliki, al-Sadr, the Sunni-led Iraqi Accord Front, and the Shia-led Fadhila (Islamic Virtue) Party. Implementation of the measure was to be delayed for 18 months due to objections from Sunnis, who feared it would lead to a partition of the country. Under the measure the oil-rich north could become a Kurdish autonomous region and the oil-rich south could become a Shia autonomous region, while the central part of the country where most Sunnis live would be left without any significant oil fields.

Iraq braced for more violence in November 2006 after a special court set up jointly by U.S. and Iraqi authorities to try Saddam Hussein found the former ruler guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced him to death. Hussein was convicted of ordering the executions of 148 men and boys in the mainly Shia town of Dujail in retaliation for a 1982 assassination attempt on Hussein that apparently originated in Dujail. In December Iraq’s Supreme Court upheld the sentence, and Hussein was executed by hanging. A cellphone videotaping of the execution, which showed guards mocking Hussein as he went to the gallows, threatened to worsen sectarian tensions in Iraq.

In early 2007 the United Nations reported that 2 million Iraqis had fled Iraq and another 727,000 had become displaced within Iraq. Sectarian conflict resulted in the displacement of Sunnis and Shias from neighborhoods, especially in Baghdād, where Sunnis and Shias formerly lived together peaceably. By September 2007 most reports indicated that the refugee situation had worsened. An estimated 2.5 million Iraqis had fled the country, with many living in neighboring Jordan and Syria, while an estimated 2.1 million Iraqis had been uprooted from their homes and were internally displaced within Iraq as a result of sectarian violence and threats of violence. See also U.S.-Iraq War.

The quality of life for Iraqis continued to deteriorate with most Iraqis having limited access to electricity and clean drinking water. The relief agency Oxfam estimated in July 2007 that about 70 percent of Iraqis were without adequate water supplies, an increase from 50 percent in 2003. Due to the lack of sanitation, a cholera epidemic broke out in September 2007. In October the World Health Organization (WHO) documented 14 deaths from more than 3,300 confirmed cases of cholera. An additional 30,000 cases of diarrhea could have been a milder form of cholera, WHO reported. In some cases Iraq’s water supplies were not being adequately treated with chlorine because insurgents had used chlorine for making bombs and U.S. forces had placed shipments of chlorine under tight control.

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In early August 2007 the al-Maliki government came under serious strain as 17 cabinet ministers either withdrew from the government, submitted their resignations, or refused to attend Cabinet meetings. Among the defectors were cabinet ministers belonging to the Iraqi Accord Front, the main Sunni bloc in the government. Al-Maliki came under intense criticism from abroad, with several U.S. senators, including Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton, calling for his resignation. U.S. president George Bush continued to back al-Maliki publicly, but some political observers believed that Bush’s support was lukewarm.

Iraq’s governing coalition appeared fragile, especially after a key Shia group signaled that it could no longer accept a compromise proposal for a proposed oil law. Passage of a new oil law was one of the principal benchmarks set by the Bush administration and the U.S. Congress for signs of progress in Iraq. In September 2007 Iraq’s oil minister disputed an oil exploration contract signed by the Kurdish regional government with the Hunt Oil Company of Dallas, Texas, saying it violated the spirit of a proposed federal oil law that the cabinet had submitted to Iraq’s parliament. Just days later the Sadr Movement headed by Muqtada al-Sadr, with 32 seats in the parliament, formally withdrew from the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the governing coalition, after earlier quitting the cabinet. The smaller Fadhila Party, which had also been part of the UIA, had withdrawn from the alliance in March. The combined defections left the UIA with 70 seats in parliament. Since the UIA was still the largest bloc and because the Sadr Movement signaled that it would not challenge al-Maliki’s leadership, the UIA was expected to continue to govern but al-Maliki’s hold on power was precarious.

Many Iraqis reacted with anger to what they saw as threats to Iraq’s sovereignty during two incidents in September 2007. The first was the passage in the U.S. Senate of a nonbinding resolution that called for decentralizing Iraq by creating three semiautonomous regions—a Kurdish north, a Shia south, and a Sunni area in central Iraq. A joint statement by the Sunni-led Iraqi Accord Front and several Shia parties condemned the resolution, calling it an attempt to partition Iraq and a signal that the United States planned a long-term occupation. The second incident involved a shooting spree by Blackwater USA security guards that killed 17 Iraqis and wounded 27 others in western Baghdād (see Private Military Firms). Iraqis were incensed that a U.S. decree gave the private contractors immunity from Iraqi law. An Iraqi government investigation into the incident concluded that the shooting was unprovoked, and the government demanded that the guards be brought to trial.

As 2007 ended, there were signs of growing impatience with the U.S. occupation from the various Shia religious parties making up the Iraqi government. In October the acting head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) pledged to oppose long-term U.S. military bases in Iraq. The ISCI had earlier agreed to end fighting between its Badr Corps and the Mahdi Army of al-Sadr in a pact that was negotiated with the help of the Iranian government headed by Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei. Despite charges from U.S. military forces that Iran was arming militias and providing insurgents with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for use against U.S. troops, the Iraqi government continued to maintain warm ties with Iran. However, in a significant development, the ISCI eliminated from its party platform a pledge that it takes its guidance from Khamenei, saying instead that it recognized the spiritual leadership of Iraq’s Ayatollah al-Sistani. Political observers said that the ISCI leadership was trying to make the party more acceptable to Iraq’s Shias, many of whom disagree with any notion that Khamenei has transnational authority.

The Iraqi government’s ties with Iran went beyond the fact that both are Shia. Economic trade between the two countries was also extensive. In October 2007 Iraq announced that it had awarded $1.1 billion in contracts to Iranian and Chinese companies to build two electrical power plants. The announcement proved particularly embarrassing for the U.S. occupation force, which has been unable to provide Iraq with a consistent supply of electricity.

Among Iraq’s Sunnis, 22 resistance groups announced in October that they had formed a political coalition and a unified command. Former Iraqi prime minister Allawi said he had opened negotiations with the leader of one of the groups, Izzat al-Douri, a former Baath Party official who was generally recognized as the leader of the largely secular Sunni insurgency. Douri was reportedly open to a ceasefire if the United States declared a timetable for a U.S. troop withdrawal.

The Bush administration, however, rejected any notion of a timetable and announced in November 2007 that it had negotiated an agreement with al-Maliki for a long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq. Iraqi government officials indicated that the “declaration of principles” provided for at least 50,000 U.S. troops to remain in Iraq for the long term. Officials for both the Bush and al-Maliki governments indicated that since the agreement was not a treaty, no approval was required by the respective legislatures of the two countries, although substantial opposition to a long-term U.S. military presence exists in both legislative bodies. In mid-November 2007 Bush signed into law the 2008 Defense Appropriations Act, which stipulates that the United States cannot establish permanent military bases in Iraq nor can it exercise control over Iraq’s oil resources. However, Bush issued a signing statement saying that he was free to disregard several of the law’s provisions.

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Irag’s Relations with Neighboring Turkey and Iran

As 2008 began, Iraq’s relations with Turkey, its neighbor to the north, were seriously strained, while relations with neighboring Iran to the east continued to improve, particularly following a historic visit to Iraq by Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Turkish army staged an eight-day incursion into the northern Kurdistān region of Iraq in late February in an attempt to crush guerrillas loyal to the Kurdistāan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK guerrillas had been staging cross-border raids into Turkey from their bases in northern Iraq and had killed a number of Turkish soldiers. The PKK seeks some form of autonomy for Kurds living in Turkey and enjoys some popular support among Iraq’s Kurds. Iraq’s cabinet demanded an immediate withdrawal of Turkey’s military forces, saying the incursion violated Iraq’s sovereignty. United States secretary of defense Robert M. Gates also called for Turkey’s withdrawal, which took place the next day on March 1.

March also saw the first state visit to Iraq by an Iranian head of state since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. Ahmadinejad’s visit with Iraq’s principal leaders in the capital, Baghdād, complete with motorcade and welcoming ceremonies, contrasted sharply with the visits of U.S. president George W. Bush, who remained confined to U.S. military bases during his visits. The Iranian leader’s trip, however, prompted protests by Sunnis who reportedly fear that Iran will attempt to dominate Iraq. And there were also indications that some Shia were wary of Iran’s growing influence with the Iraqi government and political parties in the governing coalition.

Juan Cole reviewed the History section of this article.

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