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Introduction; Land and Resources; People and Society; Arts and Culture; Economy; Government ; History

Demilitarization and Democratization Under the Occupation

Beginning with Japan’s formal surrender on September 2, 1945, the Allies placed the country under the control of a U.S. army of occupation. An international Allied Council for Japan, sitting in Tokyo, was created to assist the Americans, who presided over the dissolution of the Japanese colonial empire and the disbanding of all Japanese military and naval forces. In 1946 an 11-nation tribunal convened in Tokyo to try a number of Japanese wartime leaders, including Tōjō, for war crimes. American occupation policy aspired to more than a simple demilitarization of Japan. It aimed at destroying the social, political, and economic conditions that had made Japan an aggressor nation, and transforming Japan into a peaceful democratic nation that would never again threaten its neighbors or world peace. Under the guidance of U.S. general Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander for the Allied powers, the Japanese were subjected to the most sweeping program of reform they had experienced since the Meiji Restoration.

Political democratization centered on a revised constitution, promulgated in 1947. The new constitution stripped the emperor of the enormous powers granted to him by the Meiji constitution, making him instead the symbol of the Japanese nation and restricting his official functions to largely ceremonial duties. It placed the National Diet, formerly the Imperial Diet, at the center of the political process. The constitution provided for a British-style parliamentary system, with a cabinet elected by and responsible to the House of Representatives. The electorate was expanded to include all adults, including women. The constitution also guaranteed basic civil and political rights, including a number of rights not included in the U.S. constitution, such as the right of labor to bargain collectively. But the most radical article of the new constitution was Article 9, under which Japan renounced war and the use of force to settle international disputes, and pledged not to maintain land, sea, or air forces to that end. Although this “peace constitution” was originally drafted in English by American occupation officials, it was debated and ratified by the Japanese Diet.

To build a rural base for democracy, occupation officials promoted a land reform program that allowed tenant farmers to purchase the land they farmed. In cities, the occupation encouraged the growth of an active labor union movement. By the end of 1946 about 40 percent of Japan’s industrial labor force was unionized. To weaken the power of big business, the occupation adopted a program of economic deconcentration, breaking up the large conglomerates known as zaibatsu. Occupation authorities also purged the business community of those leaders thought to have cooperated with wartime militarists.

On the whole, the Japanese population welcomed these changes. The Americans encouraged an atmosphere of free public debate and discussion on nearly every kind of issue, from politics to marriage to women’s rights. After years of wartime censorship and thought control, most Japanese appreciated their new freedom. At first the Americans also encouraged the emergence of a vital and active left wing, including a legal Japanese Communist Party, in the hopes that it would play the role of a strong democratic opposition.

The Occupation’s “Reverse Course”

With the rise in the late 1940s of the Cold War (the struggle between the United States and its allies and the USSR and its allies), the American desire to reform Japan was overtaken by a desire to turn the country into a strong ally. The resulting change in occupation policy is often called the “reverse course.” In 1947 and 1948 the U.S. government in Washington decided to actively promote the recovery of Japan’s devastated economy. The American occupation reversed its policy of breaking up big business concerns, and it encouraged the Japanese government to adopt anti-inflation policies and to stabilize business conditions through fiscal austerity. Conservative political leaders like Yoshida, who hoped to restore Japan’s position in the world as an economic power, welcomed the change in direction. With assistance from the United States, the Japanese government also began to crack down on the domestic Communist movement and curb the activities of radical labor union groups.

In September 1951, after more than a year of consultation and negotiation, Japan, the United States, and 47 other countries signed a peace treaty in San Francisco returning Japan to full sovereign independence. Japan renounced all claims to Korea, Taiwan, the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin, and the country’s former mandates in the Pacific, as well as all special rights and interests in China and Korea. The treaty also established U.S. trusteeship of the Ryukyu Islands, including the island of Okinawa, which the United States had occupied during the war. In return, Japan was not subjected to punitive economic restrictions. In light of its fragile economic position, it was permitted to make reparation payments to the countries it had invaded and occupied in goods and services rather than in cash.

The San Francisco treaty, however, failed to resolve Japan’s relations with the Communist adversaries of the United States—the USSR and China. The USSR refused to sign the peace treaty, maintaining that it would lead to a resurgence of Japanese militarism. And neither the government in Beijing, ruled by the Communists, nor the Nationalist government on Taiwan, ruled by the Kuomintang (which had retreated to the island after the Communists gained control of the Chinese mainland in 1949), were invited to the peace conference because of international dissent over which government legitimately ruled China. Nevertheless, the United States made Japan’s recognition of the government on Taiwan as China’s legitimate government a condition of its own acceptance of the treaty; thus, in a separate agreement Japan promised to deal only with the Nationalists.

Finally, to ensure Japan’s defense and secure it as an ally of the United States, the two countries signed a bilateral mutual security treaty that allowed the United States to maintain military bases and forces in Japan. The peace treaty and the collateral agreements had the effect of aligning Japan firmly with the Western bloc of nations. On April 28, 1952 the peace treaty became effective, and full sovereignty was restored to Japan.

Domestic Debate over Japan’s International Role

During the course of the 1950s Japan reestablished normal diplomatic relations with most of the countries that had not signed the peace treaty, and negotiated reparations agreements with the countries it had invaded. In 1956 the USSR and Japan agreed to end the technical state of war that had existed between the two countries since 1945; however, they did not formally conclude a peace treaty. A continuing source of conflict was the question of ownership of the Kuril Islands. The San Francisco peace treaty had not specified which islands were included in the Kurils, and Japan continued to claim three islands and one island group occupied by the USSR. The USSR agreed in principle to return the islands nearest Hokkaidō if a peace treaty was signed between the two countries, but the issue of the other two islands was left open. With the USSR no longer blocking the way, in 1956 the United Nations (UN), an international organization founded in 1945 to promote peace, security, and economic development, admitted Japan to its membership.

Nevertheless, Japan’s postwar international role remained a subject of domestic political debate in the 1950s. The mutual security treaty, along with the Yoshida government’s commitment to rearm Japan by creating a new National Self-Defense Force (SDF), caused bitter disagreement between the right and the left. The conservative political parties, which became unified as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955, favored close ties with the United States. They supported limited rearmament but hoped to revise the security treaty to provide for greater equality between the two countries. The left wing, including the Socialist and Communist parties, opposed the security treaty. They called for Japan to maintain a position of neutrality in the Cold War, allied with neither the United States nor the USSR.

The Japanese public, fearful that Japan might be pulled into a war between the U.S. and Soviet blocs, also harbored doubts about the treaty. In the spring of 1960 the debate over ratification of a revised security treaty occasioned massive popular demonstrations and riots in Tokyo and other large cities. The sitting prime minister, Kishi Nobusuke, was forced to resign. To many it seemed that Japan’s postwar democracy was facing a major crisis. But the revised treaty was ratified by the LDP-dominated Diet, and by the end of summer political calm had been restored. For the next three decades the LDP continued to govern the country, and its policies of cooperation with the United States abroad and economic development at home set the course for postwar Japan.

Era of Growth

Rapid Economic Growth

By the early 1960s the focus of public attention had shifted from international issues to domestic economic ones. Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, who took office in July 1960, announced a plan to double household incomes over the next decade. This dramatic announcement was welcome news to the public. After decades of economic depression, wartime hardship, and postwar austerity, ordinary Japanese were more interested in a secure and comfortable future than in grand political issues.

The recovery of the economy had already begun during the Korean War (1950-1953), when UN fighting forces had used Japan as a logistical base. Procurement of military supplies and repair of damaged military equipment stimulated Japan’s manufacturing sector. The Korean War boom was followed by a series of new growth spurts in the late 1950s. Indeed, from 1955 to 1973 Japan’s gross national product (a measure of a country’s total economic output) grew at an annual average rate of 9 percent, much faster than any other industrial economy was growing at that time. By 1968 Japan had become the third largest economy in the world. To be sure, the whole world economy was expanding during this period, but Japan’s success seemed to be an “economic miracle.”

The reasons why the Japanese economy grew so fast are complex. First, a bureaucracy with jurisdiction over economic matters, based in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Bank of Japan (BOJ), had considerable administrative power to promote industrial growth through tax breaks, import and export licenses, and direct subsidies. The economic bureaucracy backed high tech industries that could supply the domestic market and compete in international markets as well. Second, corporate leaders were more interested in company growth and market share than in short-term profits, and thus they constantly reinvested their gains in updating and improving technology. Third, corporate policy stressed the need to develop and hold on to loyal and highly skilled workers. Large corporations guaranteed their workers lifetime employment, wage and salary increases based on seniority, and corporate welfare benefits. Fourth, the Japanese work force was well educated, driven by a strong work ethic, and disinclined to strike or carry out work stoppages. Fifth, Japanese consumers, responding to the new availability of high quality consumer goods such as refrigerators and automobiles, eagerly bought up industrial output. This expansion of the domestic market was the driving force behind rapid growth. And finally, the Japanese economy was not burdened by heavy military expenditures and the taxes needed to pay for them because Japan depended on the United States for its basic national defense.

The era of rapid economic growth ended in the early 1970s, when Japan’s economy underwent a sudden slowdown brought on in part by two external events. In 1971 the United States abandoned the system of fixed foreign exchange rates that had been in place since World War II. This change caused the value of the yen to rise, and consequently, Japanese exports fell. In 1973 an increase in crude oil prices caused recessions in countries around the world; in Japan it inspired panic buying by consumers who feared shortages and price increases, double-digit inflation, and a sudden slowdown in the growth rate. Timely government and corporate policies, including a drive to expand Japanese exports, soon overcame these difficulties, but growth continued only at a much slower and steadier rate of 4 to 5 percent, about half what it had been during the high growth years of the economic miracle.

Social and Environmental Impacts of Growth

The social impact of rapid economic growth was enormous. The most obvious effect was rapid urbanization, especially along the industrial corridor stretching from Tokyo-Yokohama in the east along the Pacific coast through the Inland Sea to northern Kyūshū. Between 1955 and 1970, people were pouring into Japan’s six major cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Ōsaka, Nagoya, Kyōto, and Kōbe) at an average rate of 1 million per year. Just before hosting the 1964 Olympic Games, Tokyo became the first city in the world to claim a population of 10 million. At the same time, Japan’s rural population shrank rapidly. By the 1980s less than 10 percent of the workforce was engaged in agriculture. That figure had dropped to 5 percent by the early 2000s.

Rising household incomes and savings produced by the economic miracle transformed Japan into a middle-class society. Compared to other industrial countries, Japan had a relatively equal distribution of income, and few pockets of extreme poverty remained, even in the countryside. To most Japanese the ideal social status was that of the “salary man”—the white-collar middle-class employee of a large corporation. Since access to white-collar status depended on education, high school completion rates rose rapidly, as did attendance at colleges and universities.

But rapid economic growth had a downside. The Japanese had built the world’s third-largest economy with a population half that of the United States, in a country whose territory could fit comfortably within the boundaries of Montana. The results were predictable: overcrowded cities and suburbs, air pollution and water pollution, huge accumulations of solid waste and garbage, overloaded highway and public transportation systems, and a disintegrating natural environment. During the 1960s and 1970s local citizens’ movements fought against the worst cases of industrial pollution. Under increasing public pressure, the LDP governments passed legislation setting tough automobile and noise pollution standards and providing compensation for pollution-related health problems. But difficulties such as crowded urban housing, lengthy commutes, and traffic problems were less easy to deal with.

Despite the domestic problems accompanying rapid economic growth, the other advanced nations recognized that Japan had emerged as an economic superpower. When the first economic summit was convened at Versailles, France, in 1975, Japan was invited to join as one of the “big five” nations. With international recognition came a recovery in national self-confidence. During the 1970s and 1980s books explaining the secrets of Japan’s economic success became bestsellers abroad, while at home a new cultural nationalism found expression in a proliferation of books explaining the distinctive strength and virtues of Japanese society.

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Demilitarization and Democratization Under the Occupation

The Occupation’s “Reverse Course”

Domestic Debate over Japan’s International Role

Era of Growth

Rapid Economic Growth

Social and Environmental Impacts of Growth