Scientific Revolution

B

Mathematization of Nature

The scientific revolution has also been characterized as the period of the “mathematization of the world picture.” Quantitative information and mathematical analysis of the physical world began to be seen to offer more reliable knowledge than the more qualitative and philosophical analyses that had been typical of traditional natural philosophy. The mathematical sciences had their own long history, but thanks to Aristotle's strictures they had always been kept separate from natural philosophy and regarded as inferior to it. Aristotle's authority weakened throughout the Renaissance, however, as the rediscovery of the writings of other ancient Greek philosophers with views widely divergent from those of Aristotle, such as Plato, Epicurus, and the Stoics, made it plain that he was by no means the only ancient authority.

As skepticism became credible in light of the remarkable exposures of the failings of traditional intellectual positions, mathematics became an increasingly powerful force. Mathematicians claimed to deal with absolute knowledge, capable of undeniable proof and so immune from skeptical criticisms. The full story of the rise in status of mathematics is complex and crowded. Notable contributors included Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus, who claimed that, for no other reason than that the mathematics indicated it, Earth must revolve around the Sun, and German astronomer Johannes Kepler, who reinforced this idea with astronomical measurements vastly more precise than any that had previously been made. Copernicus’s moving Earth demanded a new theory of how moving bodies behave. This theory of motion was effectively initiated as a new mathematical science by Galileo and reached its pinnacle a few decades later in the work of Isaac Newton.

C

Practical Uses of Scientific Knowledge

Experimentalism and mathematization were both stimulated by an increasing concern that knowledge of nature should be practically useful, bringing distinct benefits to its practitioners, its patrons, or even to people in general. Apart from supporting dubious medical ideas, the only use to which natural philosophy had been put throughout the Middle Ages was for bolstering religion. During the scientific revolution the practical usefulness of knowledge, an assumption previously confined to the magical and the mathematical traditions, was extended to natural philosophy. To a large extent this new emphasis was a result of the demands of new patrons, chiefly wealthy princes, who sought some practical benefit from their financial support for the study of nature. The requirement that knowledge be practically useful was also in keeping, however, with the claims of the Renaissance humanists that the vita activa (active life) was—contrary to the teachings of the Church—morally superior to the vita contemplativa (contemplative life) of the monk because of the benefits an active life could bring to others. The major spokesman for this new focus in natural philosophy was Francis Bacon, one-time Lord Chancellor of England. Bacon promoted his highly influential vision of a reformed empirical knowledge of nature that he believed would result in immense benefits to mankind.

D

Development of Scientific Institutions

Finally, the scientific revolution was also a period during which new organizations and institutions were established for the study of the natural world. While the universities still tended to maintain the traditional natural philosophy, the new empirical, mathematical, and practical approaches were encouraged in the royal courts of Europe and in meetings of like-minded individuals, such as the informal gatherings of experimental philosophers in Oxford and London that occurred during the 1650s. The Royal Society of London was established on a formal basis in 1660 by attendees of those earlier gatherings. Although nominally under the patronage of Charles II, the Royal Society received no financial support from the monarchy. A similar French society, the Académie des Sciences de Paris, however, was set up by Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis XIV's controller-general of finance, and its fellows were paid from the treasury. Whatever their precise constitution, the proliferation of collaborative scientific societies testifies to the widespread recognition that, as Bacon wrote, “knowledge is power,” and knowledge of nature is potentially extremely powerful.

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IV

Immediate Impact

These four factors—the experimental method, the mathematization of nature, the emphasis on the practical usefulness of scientific knowledge, and the development of scientific institutions—interacted with one another and were historically dependent upon one another. In combination their impact on European culture was phenomenal. To begin with, it rapidly became apparent that the traditional Aristotelian natural philosophy was completely wrong. Aristotelian teaching was so broad in scope, however, providing a ready explanation for all phenomena, that it could not simply be abandoned. New innovations and theories chipped away at Aristotelian teaching, but they were independently derived and did not hang together to provide a comprehensive alternative system. What was required was a completely new philosophy of nature that could incorporate Copernican astronomy, Galileo's new theory of motion, Harvey's new physiology, and all the other new discoveries, and show how they followed from certain basic assumptions. This ambition began to be realized in the early 17th century with the development of mechanical philosophy. There were a number of slightly different versions of this new philosophy, but their common foundation was the belief that the universe functions like clockwork according to rules and without outside intervention.

The most influential early version of mechanical philosophy was developed by French philosopher and scientist René Descartes. Powerful as Descartes's system was, its conclusions, which Descartes arrived at purely by a process of abstract reasoning, were not always compatible with experimentally determined phenomena. In late 17th-century England, a more empirically based version of mechanical philosophy was developed. The success of this version was triumphantly confirmed in 1687 with the publication of Isaac Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy).

V

The New World-View

Beginning with Descartes and culminating with Isaac Newton, the development of mechanical philosophy can be seen as the foundation of the modern scientific world-view. Previously, the dominant vision of the nature of the world had been provided by religion. Natural philosophy had been merely an adjunct to religion, a means of demonstrating God's existence and omnipotence through the study of the intricacies of nature. The fragmentation of Western Christianity after the Reformation, however, led to a weakening of religion. Furthermore, the rise of philosophical skepticism during the Renaissance quickly led to skepticism in religion.

Atheism, previously unknown in Christian Europe, gradually became an increasingly popular alternative to religion. Ironically, although all of the major figures in the scientific revolution were devoutly religious and saw their scientific work as a way of proving the existence of an omnipotent creator, the new mechanical philosophies were appropriated by atheists. Those who wished to deny the validity of the religious world-view could use the new philosophies to suggest that the world was capable of functioning in an entirely mechanistic way with no need for supernatural intervention or supervision.

Newton's influence upon European culture was entirely unprecedented. The undeniable success of his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687) in understanding and describing the workings of nature convinced many that by applying the same methods, all problems could be solved, even moral, political, and economic problems. Many of the central beliefs of the Enlightenment and new social sciences developed at that time owed their origins to the powerful stimulus of Newtonian science. But all too often it was a Newtonian science devoid of the God that Newton himself had believed in. Newton was especially devout and explicitly stated that his system was intended to demonstrate the existence of God, but he was powerless to prevent the irreligious interpretation of his science. From then on the secular scientific world-view became increasingly dominant.